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Under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesia made 
positive strides in improving its international image, and the country’s global stature is on 
the ascent. These outcomes were largely attributed to SBY’s internationalist foreign 
policy, which adopted a principle of “a thousand friends, zero enemies” and preferred a 
multilateral approach to problem solving. Despite the successes gained from SBY’s “all 
directions” foreign policy, Indonesia’s foreign policy has turned nationalistic under 
Jokowi. In comparison with SBY’s preference for cooperation and conflict avoidance, 
Jokowi’s foreign policy decisions have shown a willingness to take unilateral actions and 
to be less conciliatory toward other countries. What set of factors informed Indonesia’s 
foreign policy during SBY’s drive for multilateralism and cooperation among countries 
and how much of the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi can be 
explained by changes in these factors? This thesis examines three domestic factors that 
have shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy under both presidents: the state of Indonesia’s 
economy, public opinion during each president’s administration, and the strength of the 
president’s political coalition. This thesis argues that changes in these three domestic 
factors took place during the period of transition between the two presidents, and 
Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to the changes, subjected to the constraints 
imposed on a democratic system, caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy.
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In 2014, Indonesia held its third direct presidential election. The incumbent, 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), was serving out his second and final 
presidential term. The election was closely contested between two candidates: Joko 
“Jokowi” Widodo, former governor of Jakarta and furniture businessman, and Prabowo 
Subianto, a former Indonesian army general and an established member of Indonesia’s 
political elite. Jokowi’s politically moderate campaign prevailed against Prabowo’s 
highly populist campaign. Jokowi’s 6.3 percent margin of victory was hailed as a triumph 
for Indonesia’s fragile democracy.  
Since his inauguration on 20 October 2014, Jokowi has made a number of highly 
publicized foreign policy decisions. These decisions, made early in his presidential term, 
have characterized his approach to foreign policy. An example is his “sink the vessels” 
policy to eradicate illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. In a bid to send a strong deterrent 
signal and exhibit Indonesia’s resolve to combat illegal fishing, Jokowi permitted 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) to destroy fishing vessels 
seized for fishing illegally in Indonesian waters.1 Jokowi’s decision to take aggressive 
and unilateral actions against errant fishing vessels, regardless of country of origin, has 
riled the countries whose ships were sunk. Jokowi’s demonstrative “sink the vessels” 
policy, however, was well received at home by Indonesians who had grown tired of the 
irresolute SBY.2 In another example, Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with countries such 
as Brazil, Netherlands, and close neighbor, Australia, were strained after Jokowi refused 
                                                 
1 Tama Salim and Ina Parlina, “RI to Sink 3 Foreign Ships for Illegal Fishing,” Jakarta Post, 
December 5, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/05/ri-sink-3-foreign-ships-illegal-
fishing.html. 
2 According to a public opinion survey conducted in January 2015 by the Indonesian Survey Institute 
(LSI-I), among Jokowi’s cabinet ministers, Indonesian Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Susi 
Pudjiastuti received the highest approval rating of 61 percent. In another survey conducted by in July 2015 
by the Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), Susi’s ministry was the highest rated with a 27 
percent approval rating. These reports cited Susi’s high approval rating in public opinion surveys was 
attributed to her popular decision to eradicate illegal fishing activities by foreign fishermen. “Susi is Best 
Performing Minister: LSI,” Jakarta Post, February 4, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/04/susi-best-performing-minister-lsi.html and Hans Nicholas 
Jong, “Survey Suggests Top Ministers on Chopping Block,” Jakarta Post, July 11, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/07/11/survey-suggests-top-ministers-chopping-block.html.  
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to grant clemency and proceeded to execute convicted drug smugglers, including 
nationals from these countries, in the period between January and April 2015.3 Similar to 
the robust Indonesian support for his “sink the vessels” policy, Jokowi’s strong stance 
against drugs and firm decision to execute the drug smugglers was popular with a 
majority of the Indonesians.4     
During Jokowi’s presidential campaign, he expressed his vision for Indonesia to 
transform into a maritime power through his poros maritime dunia (Global Maritime 
Axis) doctrine. The doctrine, which also serves as a guide for Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, is a multipronged strategy that seeks to harness Indonesia’s maritime 
history, archipelagic geography, and economic potential in order to turn Indonesia into a 
global maritime power. To that end, Retno Marsudi, Jokowi’s foreign minister, has 
expressed that the foreign ministry “will carry out the president’s vision” and “push the 
realization of the maritime axis through the enforcement of [Indonesia’s] sovereignty, 
security, and prosperity.”5   
A new metaphor, berlayar di dua samudera (sailing in two oceans), has been 
coined for Indonesia’s foreign policy by one of Jokowi’s key foreign policy advisors, 
Rizal Sukma.6 The metaphor, according to Sukma, reflects Indonesia’s growing 
confidence in its ability to safely navigate in the sea of international relations to reach the 
intended national objectives. The oceanic theme of the metaphor firmly gives recognition 
                                                 
3 Brazil, Netherlands, and Australia recalled their ambassadors following the execution of their 
nationals. Haeril Halim, Agus Maryono, and Kusumasari Ayuningtyas, “Brazil, Netherlands Recall Their 
Jakarta Ambassadors,” Jakarta Post, January 19, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/19/brazil-netherlands-recall-their-jakarta-ambassadors.html 
and Satria Sambijantoro, “After Execution, RI Hopes Strong Ties with Australia Remain,” Jakarta Post, 
April 29, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/29/after-executions-ri-hopes-strong-ties-
with-australia-remain.html.   
4 According to a poll conducted by Indo Barometer, almost 85% of survey respondents said they 
support Mr. Widodo’s firm stance on the death penalty, while more than 84% of respondents said they 
agreed with the death penalty for drug traffickers and dealers. Anita Rachman, “Widodo Earns Indonesian 
Approval for Death Penalty Stance,” Wall Street Journal (blog), April 7, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/2015/04/07/widodo-earns-indonesian-approval-for-death-penalty-
stance/.  
5 Bagus BT. Saragih, “FM to Realize Jokowi’s Maritime-Axis Vision,” Jakarta Post, October 30, 
2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/30/fm-realize-jokowi-s-maritime-axis-vision.html.  
6 Rizal Sukma, “The Global Maritime Fulcrum and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,” YouTube video, 
22:49, posted by RSISNTU, March 5, 2015, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EG3yurxmst4.   
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to the vital importance of Indonesia’s archipelagic geography in relation to national 
security.  
Much of Jokowi’s early foreign policy activism strongly indicates a departure 
from Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda under SBY. SBY’s internationalist outlook 
emphasized cooperation and multilateralism in Indonesia’s foreign policy. By contrast, 
Jokowi has adopted a unilateralist approach, preferring to focus on domestic issues. 
Although Jokowi does not rule out working with other countries, he questions the utility 
of SBY’s principle of “a thousand friends, zero enemies” in the conduct of its foreign 
relations and disparagingly asks: “What’s the point of having many friends but we only 
get the disadvantages? Many friends should bring many benefits.”7  
In her articulation of Jokowi’s objectives for the conduct of diplomatic relations 
and Indonesia’s foreign policy, Retno provides the clearest signal that Indonesia’s foreign 
policy is turning away from the direction set by the SBY administration.8 She 
acknowledges that under Jokowi, Indonesia’s foreign policy will place greater emphasis 
on domestic priorities through its practice of “pro-people” diplomacy.9 Specifically to the 
corps of Indonesian diplomats, Retno instructed them to discard “their old mindset” and 
work towards realizing President Jokowi’s “so-called Trisakti vision,” which refers to the 
attainment of political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and cultural independence 
in Indonesia.10  
With a strong focus on advancing domestic issues, demonstrated willingness to 
engage in confrontation with other countries, and inclination to take uncompromising 
unilateral actions, one could argue that compared to the general direction Indonesia’s 
foreign policy direction took under former president SBY, Indonesia’s foreign policy 
                                                 
7 Robert Wardhy, “Jokowi Signals Break with ‘Thousand Friends’ Foreign Policy,” Jakarta Globe, 
November 17, 2014, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowi-signals-break-thousand-friends-
foreign-policy/.  
8 Retno Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement,” Indonesian Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, January 8, 2015, 
http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/2015/01/annual-press-statement-2015-of-the-minister-for-foreign-affairs-
of-the-republic-of-indonesia/. 
9 “‘Thousand Friends’ Policy No More under Retno,” Jakarta Globe, October 30, 2014, 
http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/thousand-friends-policy-retno/.  
10 Saragih, “FM to Realize,” Jakarta Post. 
 4 
under Jokowi has become more nationalistic. SBY’s internationalist foreign policy has 
resulted in foreign media and scholars lauding Indonesia as a model of success in 
democratization and economic recovery.11 Why, then, has Indonesia’s foreign policy 
taken a nationalist turn under Jokowi? 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Under SBY’s presidency, Indonesia made positive strides in improving its 
international image and the country’s global stature is on the ascent.12 These outcomes 
were largely attributed to SBY’s outward looking internationalist foreign policy whereby 
concerted efforts were made “to improve Indonesia’s international image and to enhance 
its role in Southeast Asia and in the world.”13 Despite the successes gained from SBY’s 
“all directions” foreign policy, which included foreign policy goals of promoting regional 
and global “stability, peace, and prosperity” and advocating “the creation of a balanced, 
strong, and sustainable global economic growth” through its membership in the G20, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy has turned inward-looking and nationalistic under Jokowi.14 
What set of factors informs Indonesia’s foreign policy during SBY’s drive for 
multilateralism and cooperation amongst countries and how much of the nationalist turn 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi can be explained by changes in these factors? 
By identifying these casual factors and examining how they shaped the foreign policy 
                                                 
11 Joe Cochrane, “In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is an Unlikely Role Model for Democracy,” New York 
Times, September 4, 2014, http://nyti.ms/1u2VYpP; Paul Wolfowitz, “Indonesia is a Model Muslim 
Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124779665773055715; 
Anthony Deutsch, “Roubini: Goodbye China, Hello Indonesia,” Financial Times (blog), October 25, 2011, 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/10/25/roubini-goodbye-china-hello-indonesia/; and James Parker, 
“The Next Asian Tiger,” Diplomat, October 1, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/the-next-asian-tiger/.    
12 Christopher B. Roberts and Leonard C. Sebastian, “Ascending Indonesia: Significance and 
Conceptual Foundations,” in Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, eds. 
Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 1.  
13 Avery Poole, “The Foreign Policy Nexus: National Interests, Political Values, and Identity,” in 
Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, eds. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. 
Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 155. 




decisions of the two presidents, this thesis seeks to explain the causes of the nationalist 
turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Soon after its independence in 1945, Indonesia defined the underlying challenges 
of its foreign policy as the need to mendayung antara dua karang (row between two 
reefs). In the context of Indonesia’s history of anti-colonial struggle for independence and 
the Cold War, the metaphor stood for the need to maintain autonomy in the face of 
antagonistic global power blocs. This dictum of non-alignment has persisted and 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, subjected to contextualized interpretations of its bebas-aktif 
(independent and active) principle, has continually evolved to fit its national interests and 
to advance the country’s global standing.15  
Although scholars and analysts may use different metrics to assess Indonesia’s 
power, most will conclude that Indonesia is increasingly recognized as a country on the 
ascent.16 Based on the archipelagic nation’s size and demographics alone, Indonesia 
certainly possesses the potential to become a global power. However, much of the 
government’s efforts to actualize Indonesia’s aspirations of assuming a bigger role in the 
global arena have been constrained by domestic factors; Indonesia lacks the economic, 
political, and military capacities to provide a comprehensive and sustainable boost 
towards becoming a global player.17  
                                                 
15 Rizal Sukma, “The Evolution of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View,” Asian Survey 
35, no. 3, March 1995, 305-6.  
16 Sue Thompson, “Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia’s Regional and Global Role, 1945—75,” 
in Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, eds. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. 
Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 22 and Leonard C 
Sebastian and Christopher B. Roberts, “‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and 
Emerging Power Aspirations,” in Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, eds. 
Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (Baingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), 335. 
17 Rizal Sukma, “Domestic Politics and International Postures: Constraints and Possibilities,” in 
Indonesia Rising, The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ed. Anthony Reid (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2012), 90 and Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia: Yudhoyono's Legacy between Stability and 
Stagnation,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2012, no. 1 (2012): 131, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/southeast_asian_affairs/v2012/2012.mietzner.html. 
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In 2007, SBY introduced “navigating a turbulent sea” as a fresh metaphorical 
description of Indonesia’s foreign policy challenges.18 Having to strike a balance 
between Indonesia’s aspirations and realities, SBY assessed that Indonesia’s national 
interests were best served by cultivating friendly diplomatic relations to foster goodwill, 
engaging in multilateral forums to resolve complex foreign policy problems, and 
nurturing Indonesia’s positive image as a responsible emerging country. SBY proclaimed 
Indonesia as “an outward-looking country, eager to shape regional and international 
order.”19 Through his interpretation of the bebas-aktif principle, SBY’s foreign policy 
sought to promote Indonesia as “a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, 
bridge-builder.”20 SBY embraced an internationalist outlook and promoted 
multilateralism in international relations. Over the course of his presidency, he was able 
to repair Indonesia’s international image through his “a thousand friends, zero enemies” 
foreign policy.  
SBY’s aspirations for Indonesia to become a global power and to wield global 
influence were significantly hampered by the country’s relatively inferior military 
strength. SBY’s internationalist foreign policy involved Indonesia as a regional and 
global actor in a wide range of issues, some more complex and contentious than others. 
Although SBY was not successful in all his foreign policy activism, his endeavors 
improved Indonesia’s reputation. Indonesia may not have transformed into a world power 
under SBY but the country’s sustained efforts to grow its influence through the ASEAN 
platform produced results and increased Indonesia’s regional leadership.21  
Jokowi’s nationalist foreign policy, however, appears to run counter to 
Indonesia’s aspirations. Jokowi’s assertive and confrontational foreign policy is likely to 
                                                 
18 “Navigating Turbulent Seas,” Jakarta Post, January 2, 2007, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/01/02/navigating-turbulent-seas.html.  
19 Roger Mitton, “Yudhoyono Urges US to Strengthen Ties; Indonesian President Cites New Energy 
in Calling for Normalisation of Military Ties,” Straits Times, May 27, 2005, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=4G83-YGS0-0058-
X452&csi=237924&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true 
20 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Speech before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs,” May 19, 
2005, http://sby.kepustakaan-presiden.pnri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html.  
21 Mietzner, “Yudhoyono's Legacy,” 129-30 and Sukma, “Constraints and Possibilities,” 90. 
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strain foreign relations and provoke retaliatory measures from other countries. Compared 
to SBY’s decade-long presidency, Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi is likely to be 
marked by less cooperation and more confrontation with other countries. Going forward, 
identifying the causes of Indonesia’s foreign policy nationalist turn will help to diffuse 
unintended tensions between Indonesia and its neighbors. Other countries can also 
formulate appropriate responses in their conduct of foreign relations with Indonesia. 
As the only Southeast Asian country in the G20 and the primus inter pares of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia’s foreign policy attracts 
regional and global attention. Scholars have argued that domestic politics have had 
extensive impact on Indonesia’s foreign policymaking. Scholars such as Evan A. 
Laksmana and Jörn Dosch have attributed the divergence between SBY’s intentions and 
actual actions to Indonesia’s democratization.22 Both scholars conclude that democracy 
has complicated Indonesia’s foreign policymaking process through the introduction of 
new actors and the growing prominence of public opinion in foreign policy.23 The 
constraints of domestic politics explain SBY’s occasional inability to make the foreign 
policy decisions that he wanted. 
Investigating the changes in democratic Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, Greta 
Nabbs-Keller and Dewi Fortuna Anwar argue that the four amendments made between 
1999 and 2002 to Indonesia’s 1945 constitution have given the Indonesian House of 
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) significant power to hold the 
executive branch accountable for Indonesia’s foreign policy and to disapprove 
                                                 
22 Evan A. Laksmana, “Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 2 (2011): 150-60, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/contemporary_southeast_asia_a_journal_of_international_and_strategic_affair
s/v033/33.2.laksmana.html and Jörn Dosch, “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign 
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international agreements proposed by the government.24 Notable examples of divergence 
between the executive and legislative branches of the government include the 
parliament’s refusal to ratify the Indonesia—Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement 
that was signed between the two heads of state and Indonesia’s voting abstention on UN 
Security Council Resolution 1803 to reaffirm the imposition of sanctions on Iran for 
nuclear proliferation activities.25  
Besides the impact of democracy and growing importance of public opinion on 
Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, scholars such as Anwar and Sukma have examined 
various domestic factors and their effects on Indonesia’s foreign policy including the 
state of economy, role of Islam, and nationalism.26 There is, as Nabbs-Keller attests, 
unanimous agreement among scholars that domestic politics continue to inform 
Indonesia’s foreign policy.27 If so, what were the domestic sources of influence on 
Indonesia’s foreign policymaking under SBY and Jokowi? By explaining the causes of 
the nationalistic turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi, this thesis seeks to 
contribute to scholarship on Indonesia’s foreign policy and the role of domestic politics 
in foreign policy. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This literature review comprises two sections. The first section reviews how 
scholars and analysts have characterized Jokowi’s foreign policy and the evidence they 
use to support their claims of increased nationalism in Jokowi’s approach to foreign 
policy. The second section reviews how scholars have characterized Indonesian foreign 
policy during SBY’s presidency and the evidence that show Indonesia’s foreign policy 
under SBY was less nationalistic.   
                                                 
24 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian 
Foreign Policy,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2010, no. 1 (2010): 128-31, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/southeast_asian_affairs/v2010/2010.anwar.html and Greta Nabbs-Keller, 
“Reforming Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry : Ideas, Organization and Leadership,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 35, no.1 (2013): 66, doi:10.1355/cs35-1c.  
25 Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 128-31 and Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s,” 66. 
26 Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 127 and Sukma, “Constraints and Possibilities,” 82. 
27 Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s,” 57. 
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1. Characteristics of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Jokowi 
Jokowi’s foreign policy can be characterized in three ways. First, Jokowi’s Global 
Maritime Axis (GMA) doctrine has a strong focus on domestic development. The 
doctrine emphasizes the development of Indonesia’s maritime domain for the benefit of 
Indonesia’s economy. For example, Jokowi wants to reap economic benefits from 
Indonesia’s vast maritime resources by increasing maritime connectivity among 
Indonesian islands. Second, Jokowi considers foreign policy primarily as a tool to serve 
Indonesia’s interests in pragmatic ways. Consequently, Indonesia’s foreign ministry’s has 
adopted diplomasi membumi (down-to-earth diplomacy), which principally aims to serve 
the needs of Indonesians first. Third, nationalist sentiments in Indonesia’s domestic 
politics have increased in the aftermath of SBY’s presidency. Jokowi had fought against a 
highly populist opponent who remains in parliament as leader of the opposition. In 
formulating Indonesia’s foreign policy, Jokowi will need to take into account the higher 
level of nationalist sentiments among Indonesians following his election win.      
a. The Nationalist Tone of Jokowi’s GMA Doctrine  
Cognizant of the growing importance of East Asia, Jokowi sees Indonesia 
favorably positioned to facilitate the global power transition from West to East. Jokowi 
views Indonesia as a maritime nation strategically positioned in the geographical and 
ideological center of an ongoing quest for influence amongst global, middle, and 
emerging powers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Jokowi intends to capitalize on 
Indonesia’s geographical position and maritime resources to transform Indonesia into a 
maritime power astride the sea lanes between two oceans. This vision for Indonesia is 
encapsulated in his GMA doctrine, which was first mentioned during his presidential 
campaign and subsequently articulated in greater detail at the East Asia Summit in 
November 2014.28   
Consisting of five components, the GMA doctrine can be summarized as Jokowi’s 
strategy to develop the economy and grow the country’s influence through exploitation of 
                                                 
28 Rendi A. Witular, “Presenting Maritime Doctrine,” Jakarta Post, November 14, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-doctrine.html. 
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Indonesia’s maritime domain and history. To this end, Jokowi’s GMA doctrine entails 
improving Indonesia’s maritime networks and infrastructure in order for maritime trade 
to flourish. Indonesia’s maritime defense capabilities will also be bolstered in order to 
safeguard its maritime resources and ensure maritime security in the region. Jokowi 
believes that his GMA doctrine will enable Indonesia to realize its potential and 
transform into a maritime power. 
Scholars have pointed out the parallels between Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and the 
Trisakti principles.29 Indeed, Retno has established that Jokowi’s goals of developing 
Indonesia’s maritime domain for economic growth, protecting Indonesia’s maritime 
resources, and tapping into Indonesia’s rich maritime culture and history are 
embodiments of the Trisakti principles.30 Originally conceptualized in 1963 by 
Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, the Trisakti principles reflect a time of surging 
nationalism in Indonesia. Therefore, it is not surprising that with Trisakti as the major 
influence on Jokowi’s GMA doctrine, Indonesia’s foreign policy has decidedly adopted a 
more nationalist attitude in its approach.  
Based on a detailed examination of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine, Aaron L. Connelly 
contends that the objectives of Jokowi’s doctrine are mainly focused on domestic 
developments.31 Connelly notes that the first three pillars of Jokowi’s maritime doctrine, 
which focuses on Indonesian culture, fisheries, and infrastructure, mainly serve 
Indonesia’s interests.32 Only the latter two pillars, dealing with diplomacy and defense, 
                                                 
29 Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns,” RSIS 
Policy Report, April 9, 2015, 2-3, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/PR150409_Indonesias-Maritime-Doctrine.pdf and Nabbs-Keller, “Strategic 
Clarity, Political Uncertainty: Prospects for Defence and Security under President Joko Widodo,” New 
Perspectives on Indonesia: Understanding Australia’s Closest Asian Neighbour, (Perth: USAsia Centre, 
2014): 7-8, http://perthusasia.edu.au/usac/assets/media/docs/publications/E-Book_New-Perspectives-on-
Indonesia_Understanding-Australias-Closest-Neighbour.pdf . 
30 Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement.” 
31 Aaron L. Connelly, “Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy 




32 Connelly, “Sovereignty,” 8. 
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can be considered foreign policy issues.33 An example of how the GMA doctrine is 
translated into foreign policy is Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy on illegal fishing. 
Jokowi claims that the problem of illegal fishing adversely impacts Indonesia’s economy 
and Indonesia stands to lose Rp 300 trillion annually. Additionally, illegal fishing 
depletes Indonesian maritime resources and poses a threat to the country’s sovereignty.34 
He has instructed Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia’s Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 
to put errant fishing vessels through Indonesia’s judicial process and sink vessels that are 
found guilty of illegal fishing.35 Through his “sink the vessels” policy, Jokowi has 
demonstrated his willingness to seek unilateral solutions that are less conciliatory in order 
to benefit Indonesians. By contrast, SBY handled vessels arrested for illegal fishing 
differently and seized vessels were not immediately sunk.36 SBY’s preference for more 
cooperative options to deal with illegal fishing was reciprocated by Indonesia’s 
neighbors.37  
b. Pro-People and Down-to-Earth Foreign Policy   
To realize his vision of Indonesia as a maritime global power, Jokowi has 
renewed Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities to focus on domestic issues. Despite Retno 
promising “that Indonesia would not abandon its international roles,” Jokowi’s foreign 
policy reflects a greater emphasis on domestic issues than the foreign policy adopted by 
SBY.38 Jokowi’s statements on foreign policy tend to have a strong nationalist tone. For 
example, at the 25th ASEAN Summit in November 2014, Jokowi remarked that although 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 8. 
34 Hasyim Widhiarto, “Jokowi Declares War on Illegal Fishing,” Jakarta Post, November 19, 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/19/jokowi-declares-war-illegal-fishing.html and Sekretariat 
Kabinet, President Asks Minister Susi to Sink Foreign Ships That Steal Fish in Indonesian Territory,” 
posted on November 20, 2014, http://setkab.go.id/en/president-asks-minister-susi-to-sink-foreign-ships-
that-steal-fish-in-indonesian-teritory/.   
35 Ezra Sihite, “Indonesia Declares War on Illegal Foreign Fishing Boats,” Jakarta Globe, November 
18, 2014, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-declares-war-illegal-foreign-fishing-boats/ 
36 Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia in 2014: Jokowi and the Repolarization of Post-Soeharto Politics,” 
Southeast Asian Affairs (2015): 134, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/southeast_asian_affairs/v2015/2015.mietzner.html. 
37 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 134. 
38 Erwida Maulia, “Indonesia’s Absence in ‘Islam vs. West’ Issue,” Jakarta Globe, January 13, 2015, 
http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-absence-islam-vs-west-issue/.  
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Indonesia supports the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), its establishment must not 
compromise Indonesia’s national interests.39 On another occasion, when asked if he will 
continue SBY’s strategy of friendship diplomacy, Jokowi replied that Indonesia will 
“make friends with all countries; but only when doing so would be beneficial to our 
people. Do not just make friends if we are disadvantaged.”40 His reply suggested that 
Indonesia’s main motivation for foreign relations building was how much Indonesia 
stood to gain from it.41   
Connelly argues that unlike SBY’s lofty aspirations to become an international 
statesman, Jokowi is mainly interested in using foreign policy to help achieve his 
domestic reforms.42 Hence, Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities and decisions under 
Jokowi are markedly different from his predecessor. Jokowi’s standpoint on foreign 
policy is that it should deliver pragmatic outcomes that benefit Indonesians. In his words, 
Jokowi wants to “bring diplomacy back to earth … and serve the people in practical 
ways.”43 To this end, he has asked the foreign ministry to improve the provision of 
consular service and protection of Indonesian citizens overseas, which Indonesians 
perceived to have been neglected during SBY’s presidency.  
The nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy is clearly articulated by Retno. 
In Jakarta Globe’s report of her first press conference, Retno was quoted as confirming 
Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi will be geared towards supporting national 
interest rather than a continuation of SBY’s international engagements.44 Connelly also 
cites Retno’s annual foreign minister statement as further evidence of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy focus on domestic reforms.45 In her speech to deliver the Ministry of Foreign 
                                                 
39 Rendi A. Witular, “Jokowi Demands Fair Trade,” Jakarta Post, November 13, 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-demands-fair-trade.html.   
40 Tantowi Yahya, “Has Jokowi Put ASEAN on the Sidelines,” Jakarta Post, June 1, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/01/has-jokowi-put-asean-sidelines.html.  
41 Yahya, “Sidelines,” Jakarta Post. 
42 Connelly, “Sovereignty,” 6. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “‘Thousand Friends’,” Jakarta Globe. 
45 Connelly, “Sovereignty,” 18. 
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Affair’s annual statement, Retno established that Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities 
over the next five years would be to safeguard Indonesia’s sovereignty, protect 
Indonesian citizens and legal entities, and strengthen economic diplomacy.46 Indonesia’s 
diplomacy, Retno states, will “serve the needs of the people” and “be down-to-earth.”47 
In marked contrast to Retno’s foreign minister statement for 2015, the previous year’s 
statement given by Marty Natalegawa, the former foreign minister, focused global issues 
and on the maintenance of regional peace and security.48 Combined, Indonesia’s foreign 
policy priorities and approach under Jokowi will, according to Connelly, lead to more 
contentious relations with its ASEAN neighbors.49    
Based on Indonesia’s recent high profile foreign policy decisions, such as the 
“sink the vessels” policy against illegal fishing, the execution of foreigners convicted on 
drug charges, and the foreign ministry’s articulation of the top priorities in its pro-rakyat 
(pro-people) foreign policy, Jokowi appears to have fewer qualms about acting 
unilaterally for Indonesia’s interests even if that provokes other countries. Indonesia’s 
foreign policy has become more nationalist under Jokowi. In his evaluation of the impact 
of Jokowi’s presidency on Indonesia’s foreign policy, Connelly concludes that compared 
to the SBY’s presidency, Indonesia will be reluctant to assume leadership on regional and 
global issues.50 Going forward, he argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy will be less 
coherent in its direction and will adopt a more confrontational and unilateral approach to 
resolve foreign policy challenges. SBY’s brand of internationalism, espoused in his 
foreign policy of “a thousand friends, zero enemies,” had stopped. 
                                                 
46 Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement.” 
47 Ibid. 
48 Marty Natalegawa, “Annual Press Statement,” Kementerian Luar Negeri (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs), January 7, 2014, 
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49 Connelly, “Sovereignty,” 18. 
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c. Rising Nationalism in Domestic Politics 
Nationalism has been rising in Indonesia’s domestic politics and was a dominant 
theme the candidates employed at the 2014 presidential elections. Nationalism, Sukma 
explains, is at the root of Indonesia’s principle of bebas-aktif, which has guided the 
country’s foreign policy since independence.51 Therefore, it should not come as a 
surprise that nationalism has continued to be a key feature of Indonesia’s domestic 
politics and foreign policy. Between then and now, Sukma points out that the crucial 
difference lies in the impact of democracy on the manifestation of nationalism.52 No 
longer under the sole purview of the government, the influence of nationalism in 
Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy has grown more complex. Just as 
democratization has complicated the process of Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, the 
democratic expression of nationalism in Indonesia has produced a similar effect.       
The global commodities boom during SBY’s presidency enabled resource-rich 
Indonesia to achieve sustained economic growth.53 Although Indonesia’s economy grew, 
it remained reliant on the commodities sector and did not initiate reforms to wean itself 
off resource-led growth. Indonesia’s economy posted healthy GDP growth but many 
Indonesians felt that SBY was not able to eradicate the problems of corruption and high 
incidence of poverty in Indonesia.54 As the commodities boom started to taper off, 
Indonesia’s economic outlook weakened. To soften the impact of declining commodity 
prices on its economy and also to appease growing resentment among Indonesians who 
felt that foreigners were exploiting Indonesia’s resources, the Indonesian parliament 
passed a raft of protectionist measures between 2009 and 2014.55 Despite SBY’s efforts 
to enact protectionist measures to promote economic growth, the perception that he was 
ineffective in resolving Indonesia’s domestic problems grew among Indonesians.56 As 
                                                 
51 Sukma, “Constraints and Possibilities,” 87. 
52 Ibid., 88. 
53 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 128-9. 
54 Mietzner, “Yudhoyono's Legacy,” 120-8.  
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56 Ibid., 121. 
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Marcus Mietzner contends, the challenges in Indonesia’s economy required deep 
structural reforms but the SBY administration adopted “exceedingly nationalist and 
protectionist policies” that profited “mostly oligarchs with interests in natural resource 
extraction, agriculture, and horticulture.”57 In other words, SBY’s solutions were not 
beneficial to Indonesia’s economy in the long run and did not serve the needs of poor 
Indonesians.    
SBY’s reluctance to make hard but necessary political decisions and his 
misdirected efforts to overcome Indonesia’s economic challenges had unwittingly created 
a political opportunity for demagogues, such as Prabowo, to exploit.58 Unsurprisingly, 
nationalism, especially economic nationalism, became the prevailing theme during the 
2014 presidential elections.59 Mietzner argues that coupled with the perception of foreign 
exploitation of Indonesian resources, mounting economic and social problems led to 
rising nationalism in Indonesia, thereby creating “an environment in which a populist, 
belligerent challenge to the political stasis was almost inevitable.”60 
Mietzner explains that Prabowo exploited the growing support for economic 
nationalism among Indonesians by campaigning on a populist platform that criticized 
Indonesia’s democracy and favored more protectionist policies.61 With the economy 
declining and mounting dissatisfaction among Indonesians, Prabowo devised an electoral 
strategy that sought to convince Indonesians that the root of the country’s problem was 
the existing democratic regime.62 Prabowo’s campaign targeted the section of 
Indonesians who longed for a return to pre-reformasi days and presented the destruction 
of the current democratic institutional structures as a populist solution to the economic 
malaise Indonesia was in. By contrast, Jokowi offered a more restrained form of 
populism in which he disparaged SBY’s failure to bring greater tangible improvements to 
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the lives of more Indonesians but sought to improve the existing democratic regime by 
introducing reforms.  
2. Characteristics of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under SBY 
During SBY’s presidency, Indonesia made great strides in improving its 
international image and the country enjoyed a period of political and economic stability. 
In that period, Indonesia’s status as a Muslim-majority country that has successfully 
consolidated its democracy became its source of soft power. Therefore, Indonesia’s 
successful democratization enabled SBY to expand the country’s influence. But at the 
same time, democracy has introduced a range of actors into foreign policy and 
complicated the process of foreign policymaking in Indonesia. Nevertheless, SBY was 
able to pursue an internationalist foreign policy that focused on cooperation and 
multilateralism. Through his foreign policy, SBY sought to be recognized as an 
international statesman who raised Indonesia’s global influence and actively promoted 
issues on democracy and human rights.  
a. SBY’s Internationalist Outlook   
SBY sought to develop Indonesia’s stature as a key global player through his 
internationalist foreign policy and looked for opportunities to cast Indonesia as an actor 
of growing importance in international issues. In his speeches to Indonesians, SBY often 
pointed to Indonesia’s membership in multilateral organizations as “foreign policy 
successes.”63 For example, in a speech near the end of his presidency, SBY said the past 
decade (2004–2014) had been Indonesia’s “golden era” and that Indonesians should be 
proud of the country’s membership in the G20 and involvement in “global economic 
decision-making.”64  
                                                 
63 Natalie Sambhi, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Challenges and Australia—Indonesia Relations,” New 
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During SBY’s visit to the United Kingdom in 2012, he gave a speech on how 
Indonesia’s success in democratization and sustained economic growth had “strengthened 
Indonesia’s capacity to project a new activism in its foreign policy, to play greater and 
diverse roles, to help shape regional and global order.”65 SBY classified the country’s 
roles in five areas—namely, norm setter, consensus builder, peacekeeper, bridge builder, 
and voice of the developing world.66 Supported by a foreign policy that advocated 
multilateralism, Indonesia performed these roles through its membership in various 
regional and international organizations such as ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), the G20, and the United Nations (UN) and achieved varying levels of success in 
them.  
In practicing his concept of “a thousand friends and zero enemies” and an “all 
directions foreign policy,” SBY picked policies that contributed to the creation of a 
positive image for Indonesia. In addition, SBY’s penchant for summit diplomacy in 
foreign affairs was apparent.67 Beyond intra-ASEAN interactions, Jonathan Chen notes 
that Indonesia had “enhanced its engagements” in other groupings including the East 
Asia Summit, G20, and the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which was initiated by 
Indonesia in 2008.68 During SBY’s presidency, Indonesia has also actively engaged on 
many global issues, such as climate change, and was an ardent supporter of global 
institutions, including the UN and the UN Security Council.69  
Despite SBY’s foreign policy activism, Indonesia did not always make significant 
gains in diplomacy or influence. In a critical assessment of SBY’s foreign policy 
achievements, Natalie Sambhi asserts that while Indonesia has become “a more 
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prominent foreign actor” through its involvement in regional and global initiatives, 
progress towards the goals he set remained elusive.70 For example, Sambhi cites the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Indo-Pacific and the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG), were initiatives that SBY championed but which produced 
insignificant results. Without clearly defined roadmaps to realize the treaty, discussions 
on the TAC for Indo-Pacific have been stalled since December 2013.71 Considering 
SBY’s involvement as one of three chairpersons of the MDG panel, Indonesia’s failure to 
meet the targets set in the MDG is ironic, but it also points to deeper problems that 
continue to plague the country. 
b. Democratization of Foreign Policymaking 
Soeharto resigned as president of Indonesia in May 1998 after the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC) struck and the Indonesian economy collapsed. His resignation marked the 
end of the New Order and the start of reformasi (reformation) in Indonesia. The 
reformasi period saw Indonesia democratizing and foreign policymaking changing. The 
process of foreign policymaking has become more pluralistic in terms of representation 
and the policymakers have become more accountable for their policy decisions. Freed 
from authoritarian rule, Dosch observes that democratic Indonesia has allowed the entry 
of a larger number of new actors into the field of foreign policy.”72  
Dosch also makes the point that democratization has shielded foreign 
policymaking from the military’s influence. The dilution of military influence in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy is a similar point made by Anwar and Nabbs-Keller.73 Another 
common point the scholars share is the observation that Indonesia’s foreign ministry has 
become more inclusive and consultative in its foreign policymaking. Indeed, Dosch 
argues that “public opinion has proved to be a decisive factor pushing the respective 
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executive towards the prominent consideration of business, human rights, and religious 
issues” in Indonesia’s young democracy.74  
In agreement with Dosch, Nabbs-Keller describes Indonesia’s foreign 
policymaking as becoming “more deliberative and consultative, and is now subject to the 
contestation of new and recently unbridled actors including the legislature (DPR), media, 
public opinion, civil society organizations, and business groups.”75 The new process of 
foreign policymaking in Indonesia is completely different form the authoritarian 
approach before reformasi. Anwar observes that Indonesia’s democracy, with the 
introduction of new foreign policy actors, has witnessed the creation of “multiple centres 
of power,” and a democratization of Indonesian foreign policymaking.76  
A powerful change in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking is the willingness of the 
Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) to exercise its constitutional powers and 
exert domestic political pressure on foreign policy. This change further complicates the 
process because differences in policy stance between the executive and legislative 
branches can result in the latter not ratifying treaties signed by the former. For example, 
Anwar recounts the example of Indonesia reneging on its Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA) with Singapore after Indonesian provinces lobbied the DPR to 
repudiate the DCA on grounds that “Singaporean military exercises would have an 
adverse impact on the people’s livelihood.”77 In another example, Anwar describes the 
confrontation between the DPR and SBY that occurred after Indonesia, being a non-
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council at the time, voted to impose 
sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program.  
Several scholars contend that democratization has affected Indonesia’s ability to 
keep a consistent set of foreign policies. Laksmana argues that although democratization 
has expanded Indonesia’s policy scope, it has reduced Indonesia’s ability to maintain “a 
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stable and coherent foreign policy.”78 Anwar explains that because democratization 
forces Indonesia to consider a wider range of perspectives, Indonesia’s foreign 
policymaking will “become more sensitive to popular sentiments.”79 Nabbs-Keller notes 
that pluralism in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking did not produce better practices or 
decisions. Instead, under SBY’s presidency, the DPR had politicized Indonesia’s foreign 
policy issues and wielded them as political tools to challenge the executive 
branch.80According to Nabbs-Keller, democracy “has in many ways made the 
management of foreign policy issues more inflammatory and difficult for the ministry to 
contain.”81 
But by and large, SBY appeared to have successfully quelled domestic political 
pressures on his foreign policy. The inconsistencies in Indonesia’s foreign policy under 
SBY have to be measured against the successes of SBY’s diplomatic outreach during his 
decade-long presidency. Except for a few notable instances when Indonesia’s foreign 
policy decisions were challenged, SBY had adopted a fairly coherent set of foreign policy 
for the country. In sum, SBY was able to adopt an internationalist foreign policy while 
remaining accountable to Indonesians for the country’s foreign policy decisions. 
c. Democracy as Soft Power 
Besides introducing Indonesia to a more pluralistic and accountable form of 
foreign policymaking, democracy has also become an important policy tool in the foreign 
ministry’s agenda. Recognizing the leverage Indonesia’s democratization could provide 
to SBY’s internationalist foreign policy, the foreign ministry successfully capitalized on 
the Indonesia’s newly acquired image to promote issues related to democracy and human 
rights within ASEAN and around the world.82 This inclusion of “democracy promotion” 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been labelled as the foreign ministry’s “democracy 
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agenda,” which relies on Indonesia’s relatively rare status as a Muslim-majority 
democracy developing on a path of moderation and modernization.83  
Making a similar observation, Laksmana contends that the foreign ministry view 
democracy as “a very important source of ‘soft power’” to achieve Indonesia’s foreign 
policy objectives.84 Some of these objectives include improving the country’s 
international profile, and fostering a peaceful and stable regional environment that is 
conducive for economic development. Citing the changes taking place in Indonesia’s 
domestic politics, Nabbs-Keller argues that the country’s democratization, “when 
combined with Islam and pluralism,” boosted Indonesia’s image and relevance in the 
international arena.”85  
Growing Indonesia’s soft power was not the only reason for Indonesia to promote 
issues related to democracy and human rights in the region. Equally important was to 
address an internal demand among Indonesians’ for the promotion of democracy and 
protection of human rights to be tenets of Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda with its 
ASEAN neighbors.86 Policymakers thought that to introduce democratic principles to 
ASEAN countries could allow democratic Indonesia “to align Indonesia’s external stance 
with its core values at home, which now include respect for democracy and human 
rights.”87 But as noted by Jürgen Rüland and Dosch, both of whom have examined the 
impact of democracy on foreign policymaking in democratic Indonesia, the government 
was not always successful in reconciling the promotion of democratic principles in the 
region and the constraints imposed by ASEAN’s emphasis on consensus and non-
interference.88 
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Indonesia’s drive to promote democratic principles and protect human rights in 
ASEAN took a number of forms and returned varying results. Collectively, the member 
countries of ASEAN established the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which “calls for the 
establishment of an ASEAN human rights body as a new organ of ASEAN” for the 
“promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples in 
ASEAN.”89 But the charter attracted criticism within Indonesia for lacking the necessary 
power to impose sanctions on countries that violate human rights. While the absence of 
constituted powers to protect citizens against human rights abuses in the ratified ASEAN 
Charter was in line with the “ASEAN Way” of non-interference, it was negatively 
viewed by Indonesians who felt spurned by the other ASEAN countries. Such a situation 
similarly developed in the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 
on Human Rights (AICHR) in October 2009. Indonesia’s foreign ministry felt that in 
both instances, the country faced overwhelming opposition from the rest of the ASEAN 
members and felt compelled to compromise on regional mechanisms that provide 
oversight on human rights issues.90 Consequently, the disparity between what 
Indonesians expected of the ASEAN Charter and what the member countries finally 
agreed on led public and political actors to question the value of keeping ASEAN 
centrality as part of Indonesia’s foreign policy.91  
Beyond ASEAN, Indonesia also kept issues on democracy and human rights high 
on its agenda for diplomatic interactions. Under SBY, Indonesia has been “eager to share 
its experiences on democratic transition with other leaders of aspiring democracies.”92 
For example it initiated the annual Bali Democracy Forum in 2008, which is seen as a 
platform for states in the Asia-Pacific region to “exchange lessons learnt and experiences 
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on democracy.”93 SBY proudly branded the BDF as a “premier inter-governmental forum 
for exchanging ideas and sharing experiences on democracy in the region.”94 Reviews of 
the BDF are mixed: the BDF’s effectiveness in promoting democracy is unproven and its 
inclusion of authoritarian regimes such as China and Myanmar has been criticized as 
much as it has been lauded. Indonesia also made forays into the Middle East by 
advocating for the rights of the Palestinian people and encouraging democratic transition 
in the Middle East. Indonesia’s “advice on finding the right mix of religion and politics,” 
Anwar claims, was “sought by a number of Muslim countries, notably Egypt and 
Tunisia” following the Arab Spring. Without the necessary economic, political, or 
military clout, the combination of Islam, democracy, and modernization becomes an 
important source of soft power for Indonesia. Such a combination, considerably rare in a 
world where news of the turmoil of Middle Eastern Islamic countries dominates the 
headlines, is viewed by Indonesian foreign policymakers as leverage for widening and 
deepening diplomatic ties and raising Indonesia’s international image. 
3. Domestic Politics and the Nationalist Turn in Indonesia’s Foreign 
Policy 
Comparing the literature on the two presidents’ foreign policies highlights the 
differences between the two presidents’ foreign policies and helps to define the 
nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. The literature also show that 
changes in Indonesia’s domestic politics have correspondingly led to changes in 
Indonesia’s identity, the country’s view of its role in the world, and the process of foreign 
policymaking. Changes in the regional and international environment have also affected 
Indonesia’s foreign policy directions. Indonesia’s democratization, however, has been the 
dominant influence on the country’s foreign policy during SBY’s presidency. Indonesia’s 
democratization has raised the country’s international profile. Democracy also meant that 
political elites can no longer afford to dismiss domestic politics and public opinion in 
process of foreign policymaking.   
                                                 
93 Poole, “Foreign Policy Nexus,” 157. 
94 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Opening Statement by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the 
Bali Democracy Forum V,” Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia Den Haag, posted on Novemeber 8, 2012,  
http://ina.indonesia.nl/index.php/info-penting/pidato.  
 24 
a. Defining the Nationalist Turn in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy  
In comparison with SBY’s preference for cooperation and conflict avoidance, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions have indicated Jokowi’s willingness to take 
unilateral actions and lesser regard to be conciliatory. Therefore, compared to SBY’s 
internationalist foreign policy, Jokowi’s foreign policy is more nationalist. However, 
there is no evidence of hypernationalism in Indonesia: Jokowi’s foreign policy indicates a 
change in priorities, switching from global to domestic issues, but does not appear to 
exhibit chauvinism or xenophobia in its diplomatic interactions. Indonesia’s economic 
nationalism has certainly increased in response to declining commodity prices. Although 
the state of the economy certainly appears to be a significant determinant, however, that 
alone cannot account for the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jokowi’s 
adherence to the Trisakti principles in the approach taken by the Indonesian foreign 
ministry appears to be a contributing factor but the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy should really be described as multidimensional.    
Examining the differences between the foreign policies of SBY and Jokowi 
reveals three aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi that can define the 
nationalist turn. First, Indonesia’s foreign policy has undergone a domestication process 
and has focused on domestic issues. The foreign ministry has reduced its emphasis on 
regional and global issues such as climate change and issues related to democracy and 
human rights in its foreign policy agenda. Indonesia is also less interested in promoting 
its role as the bridge for the Islam—West divide, moderator for complex international 
disputes, and representative of less developed countries in economic groupings. For 
example, the foreign minister has consistently mentioned the change in foreign policy 
direction to focus on domestic issues and pledged in the ministry’s annual statement to 
provide better consular services for its overseas migrant workers. While Indonesia has 
been paying attention to the plight of Indonesians working overseas under poor 
conditions, this marks the first time it has featured as a foreign policy priority. 
The second aspect is Jokowi’s willingness to take unilateral actions to resolve 
problems that may affect diplomatic relations. Unlike SBY’s preference for 
multilateralism and cooperation, Jokowi seems more concerned with being seen to be 
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taking decisive actions than with seeking effective solutions. For instance, although 
Indonesia is unlikely to singlehandedly resolve the problem of illegal fishing in its waters 
that has not stopped Jokowi from conducting his “sink the vessels” policy, which is 
decidedly a unilateral action. This is a marked deviation from SBY’s collaborative 
approach in which the problem of illegal fishing was treated as a multifaceted regional 
problem, not just a domestic one. As such, sustainable solutions would require 
cooperation and coordination with neighboring countries. Although SBY made negligible 
progress, he consistently pressed for cooperation and a regional solution for illegal 
fishing. On the other hand, Jokowi, sensing the lack of improvement to the illegal fishing 
problem has caused exasperation in Indonesians, took the more expedient approach by 
unilaterally enforcing domestic laws over foreign vessels seized for illegal fishing in 
Indonesian waters. 
The final aspect of Jokowi’s nationalism is that Indonesia has less regard for the 
impact of its foreign policy decisions on diplomatic ties and will act in a confrontational 
manner if it is in its interest to do so. For instance, Indonesia certainly has the sovereign 
right to exercise its own laws but its insistence to do so on sensitive policy issues such as 
the dramatic sinking of seized foreign fishing vessels and execution of convicted foreign 
drug smugglers has caused bilateral relations to deteriorate. Jokowi’s decision to assert 
Indonesia’s sovereign right may advance domestic objectives and feed into populist 
sentiments at home and may even help to relieve domestic pressures generated by 
Indonesians who want quick resolutions to what they view as national problems. Such 
aggressive foreign policy decisions, however, jeopardizes Indonesia’s diplomacy with 
other countries. Moreover, in the long run, Indonesia’s confrontational approach may not 
produce the desired results and could prompt tit-for-tat actions instead. Countries on the 
receiving end of Indonesia’s assertiveness may reciprocate by becoming more 
antagonistic towards Indonesia.    
b. The Domestic Roots of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy 
A consistent overarching theme in the scholarship on the roots of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy is the assertion that domestic politics have significantly shaped Indonesia’s 
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foreign policy. Such an assertion is neither new nor unique in the study of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. Indeed, Sukma argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy has always reflected 
the country’s domestic politics.95 Scholars and analysts have focused their research on 
the changes in Indonesia’s domestic politics to trace the determinants of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. Although their research do not preclude contextualizing changes in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy directions to the regional and international environment, the 
literature highlights the impact of changes in domestic politics on foreign policy. These 
changes, in turn, enable the concomitant expansion of foreign policy space in certain 
areas and reduction of foreign policy activism in others.   
The scholarship on Indonesia’s post-reformasi foreign policy has tended to focus 
on the impact of democracy. Much of the scholarship, Nabbs-Keller asserts, is focused on 
assessing two effects of Indonesia’s democratization.96 The first effect is DPR’s role in 
raising transparency and introducing plurality in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking. The 
second effect is the incompatibility between democratic principles and existing political 
norms within Indonesia and the region. Indeed, Indonesia’s democratization and the 
impact it has on foreign policy and policymaking have been intensely studied. In 
response to the narrow focus in previous literature, Nabbs-Keller’s research widens the 
scholarship by examining the role of the reformed foreign ministry and the foreign 
ministers of the time in driving change in the country’s foreign policy.97  
Scholars have pointed out different ways in which domestic politics shaped 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. For example, Sukma asserts that Indonesia’s foreign policy 
“remains subject to both the facilitating and constraining effects of domestic political 
factors” such as “the state of Indonesia’s democracy, the role of Islam, the assertion of 
nationalism, and the presence of persistent domestic weakness.”98 Avery Poole argues 
that unequal distribution of economic gains from Indonesia’s democracy agenda has 
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resulted Indonesians “seeking to challenge the domestic democratic project” and 
demanding the government to serve their needs.99 In addition, Anwar contends that the 
introduction of pluralism and transparency to the Indonesian foreign policymaking 
process has presented “both constraints and opportunities to the traditional foreign policy 
establishment.”100 Here, Anwar and Laksmana make a similar point when they both 
describe how democracy has complicated Indonesia’s foreign policymaking but also 
provided Indonesia with a source of soft power. And it is with this soft power that SBY 
was able to expand Indonesia’s foreign policy space and fulfil the aspiration of Indonesia 
becoming a global player in international relations.  
The prime drivers of Indonesia’s foreign policy, as Paige Johnson Tan assesses, 
are contextualized to the country’s domestic politics and needs.101 Although Indonesian 
political leaders aspire to achieve great things for Indonesia through an activist foreign 
policy, the country’s political and economic conditions, and sometimes even natural 
disasters, provide a practical limit on Indonesia’s aspirations.102 Tan gives the example of 
SBY taking office at a time when Indonesia’s international image was tarnished in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and the economy needed a boost in terms of 
foreign investments and aid.103 Thus, in order to meet domestic needs, SBY had to steer 
Indonesia’s foreign policy towards rebuilding Indonesia’s image and promoting 
multilateralism. It was within such a domestic context that SBY’s internationalist foreign 
policy was developed and sustained. 
Just as domestic politics have shaped SBY’s foreign policy approach and 
decisions, Jokowi will have to accordingly adjust to accommodate domestic political 
pressures. Jokowi’s presidency and foreign policy must be situated within Indonesia’s 
domestic context in order to determine the causes of Indonesia’s nationalist turn. While 
much of the literature has focused on the relationship between Indonesia’s domestic 
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political factors and the country’s foreign policy, due to Jokowi’s relatively short period 
of presidency for assessment, it has been limited to evaluations of SBY’s presidency. A 
year has passed since Jokowi took office and there is sufficient scope for research that 
concentrates on examining the dominant domestic political pressures that have shaped 
Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi and evaluating the changes in domestic politics 
during the transition between the two presidents.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
During SBY’s presidency, there was strong domestic support for Indonesia to 
promote democracy and human rights issues. That support enabled SBY to advance his 
internationalist foreign policy. On the contrary, rising nationalism in Indonesia’s 
domestic politics during Jokowi’s presidency meant that the president had to reflect such 
a domestic trend by trumpeting nationalism in his foreign policy. However, the 
nationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy can also be accounted for by Jokowi’s 
perception of what foreign policy should bring to Indonesia, his desire to improve the 
welfare of Indonesians, and the strong domestic priorities in his GMA doctrine to develop 
Indonesia’s maritime domain to benefit Indonesians. The need to provide for the 
economic needs of Indonesians is especially relevant as commodity prices have declined 
and adversely affected Indonesia’s natural resource-dependent economy.  
In addition, Jokowi is the first Indonesian president who is not considered a 
member of the elite.104 Unlike SBY who was a former military general and wielded 
significant influence with Indonesian elite circle, Mietzner notes that Jokowi “had to 
make numerous compromises with established elites” in order to mount a credible 
campaign against his opponent.105 These differences affect the strength of each 
president’s political coalition and their ability to push ahead with national reforms and a 
foreign policy that supports those reforms.    
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Scholars exploring the determinants of Indonesia’s foreign policy do consider the 
regional and international context in which Indonesia’s foreign relations are conducted, 
but the majority premises their research, in varying proportions, on the impact of 
domestic factors on Indonesia’s foreign policy. The impact of democracy on Indonesia’s 
foreign policy was the prime candidate for scholarly research because democratization 
caused significant changes across a broad spectrum of Indonesia’s domestic politics. 
During SBY’s presidency the rising influence of democratic principles in foreign 
policymaking was the single most impactful change in Indonesia’s domestic politics. 
Consequently, in the last decade, Indonesia’s democratization and its effect on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy became the most studied aspect of Indonesian domestic 
factors. 
The literature review on the dominant factors that shape Indonesia’s foreign 
policy has led to the hypothesis that will be investigated. This thesis will examine three 
domestic factors that have shaped Indonesia’s assertive foreign policy under Jokowi: the 
state of Indonesia’s economy, public opinion on Jokowi’s administration, and the 
strength of the president’s political coalition. This thesis argues that these three domestic 
factors have evolved considerably over the course of the two presidencies. In turn, 
Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to these changes, subjected to the constraints 
imposed on a democratic system, caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy.  
E. METHOD AND SOURCES 
The thesis will discuss how each of the three selected domestic factors had 
appeared in the respective presidencies and had given rise to the two different foreign 
policies. Next, the hypothesis will be tested against evidence from Indonesia’s illegal 
fishing problem -- an issue both presidents faced. This will determine if changes in the 
three domestic factors that occur during the presidential transition have indeed caused the 
nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.  
Evidence for the case study will be obtained from a mix of primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources will include ministerial statements and records on Indonesia’s 
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stance on the eradication of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. Newspaper articles, 
Indonesian and non-Indonesian, will also be used to track official statements made by the 
various Indonesian ministries. Secondary sources will largely be from scholarly articles 
and newspaper reports.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of four chapters. The first half of the thesis surveys the 
literature on Indonesia’s foreign policy, defines the nationalism in the current foreign 
policy, and describes the domestic factors that have shaped the nationalist turn in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. The second half of the thesis describes the case 
study and test the hypothesis.   
This introductory chapter has outlined the research question and stated its 
significance. The chapter highlights the characteristics of the two presidents’ foreign 
policies and by comparing both presidents’ foreign policies, the nationalist turn that has 
taken place in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi was defined. A survey of the 
scholarship on the sources of influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy indicates how 
domestic politics matter in Indonesian foreign policymaking  
The second chapter describes changes in the three domestic factors that took place 
under the two presidents. The chapter discusses how changes in the three domestic 
factors generated diametrically opposite foreign policies.   
Chapter III examines Indonesia’s “sink the vessels” policy as a case study. It 
discusses in detail the context of Jokowi’s decision to take a hardline approach on illegal 
fishing and examines why, in comparison to SBY’s approach, his approach is considered 
nationalistic.   
The final chapter analyzes and tests the hypothesis against the evidence from the 
case study. The analysis of the “sink the vessels” policy shows that Indonesia’s 
nationalist foreign policy has to be understood in relation to internal and external tensions 
the president faces. Finally, the thesis concludes with the scholastic and policy 
implications of the hypothesis.  
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II. THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF INDONESIA’S FOREIGN 
POLICY 
A. THE INCREASING INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN 
INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
Democracy has significantly increased the influence of domestic politics on 
Indonesian foreign policymaking because democratic governments are expected to be 
accountable for their foreign policy goals and decisions to the electorate. Researching on 
the impact of democratization on the making of foreign policy in former authoritarian 
regimes, Dosch argues that accountability has limited influence on foreign policymaking 
in authoritarian regimes. By contrast, accountability in a democracy can legitimately 
impose in a democracy restrictions on the government’s foreign policy.106 Hence, 
Indonesia under authoritarian regime was able to negate much of the domestic political 
pressure on the conduct of foreign policy but foreign policy in democratic Indonesia is 
constraint by support from both the president’s political coalition and the electorate. As a 
democracy, Indonesia faces the same requirements of being accountable and this has led 
to domestic politics having a greater influence after the post-New Order reforms.    
1. Two-level Game 
Researching Indonesia and other democracies in Southeast Asia, Dosch refers to 
Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, which contends that foreign policymaking can 
be thought of as a game the government plays in two contexts: one at the national level 
and the other at the international level.107 At the national level, domestic interest groups, 
who form part of the electorate, pressure the government to adopt preferred foreign 
policy. In return, the government seeks support from these domestic interest groups to 
remain in office. At the international level, the government makes foreign policy 
decisions that generate maximal support from domestic interest groups, yet keep the risk 
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of jeopardizing diplomatic relationships to the minimal.108 Therefore, the democratized 
Indonesian government is often constraint by having to meet conflicting domestic and 
international demands as politicians try to take an approach to foreign policy that 
domestic interest groups find acceptable yet maximizes benefit to the country.  
Building on the application of the two-level game theory in Indonesia’s foreign 
policymaking process, Dosch draws on Joe Hagan’s nuanced analysis of the theory’s 
application at the national level. Hagan expands the national level political game and 
argues that politicians actually have to contemporaneously engage in two, not one, 
national level games.109 In the first national level game, because other domestic political 
entities may share control over foreign policy decisions, the government is pressured to 
form political coalitions to smoothen the decision-making process. In the second national 
level game, because the government wants to retain its political dominance across 
electoral cycles, it is pressured to take the approach that will garner the greatest domestic 
support.110 Hagan’s analysis of the dynamics created from the games played at the 
national level are reflective of the political environment in which SBY and Jokowi 
operate in.  
2. Winning Moves in the Two-level Game 
Dosch’s research shows how foreign policy and domestic politics is intricately 
intertwined in Indonesia. In his conclusion, Dosch highlights public opinion becoming a 
pivotal domestic political factor in Indonesia that guides the government “towards the 
prominent consideration of business, human rights and religious issues.”111 As a 
democracy, it is also obvious that Indonesian foreign policymakers cannot ignore the 
importance of strong political coalitions as they play the two-level game rationalizing 
national and international pressures. So long as Indonesia remains economically and 
politically interdependent with other countries, its decision-makers will need to play the 
                                                 
108 Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 434. 
109 Dosch, “Impact of Democratization,” 45-6. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 66. 
 33 
two-level game. In the current reality of globalized international trade and politics, 
Indonesia cannot choose otherwise. In addition, the two-level game played by Indonesian 
foreign policymakers adds another constraint to those already imposed by the country’s 
lack of clout in the economics, political, and military realms to fulfil Indonesia’s 
aspirations for global leadership.     
Conventional wisdom suggests that a president should face less resistance in 
advancing his preferred foreign policy if the country he is running has a positive 
economic outlook. Likewise, a president should have a positive public opinion, as 
reflected in approval rating polls, if his foreign policy approach finds favor with domestic 
interest groups. The process of foreign policymaking among the political leadership will 
also be smoother and more aligned with the preferred direction of the president if 
supported by a strong political coalition.  
Returning to Putnam’s two-level game analogy of the political complexities, he 
describes the possibility of opportunities for astute leaders to devise a coherent set of 
policy moves that provide winning outcomes across all levels of the game. In his words, 
Putnam says that occasionally, “clever players will spot a move on one board that will 
trigger realignments on other boards.”112 This thesis will show that SBY did indeed spot 
such an opportunity during his presidency. Through his internationalist foreign policy, 
SBY was able to “trigger realignments” across Indonesia’s domestic and international 
politics. However, the domestic and international conditions that created such an 
opportunity for SBY’s internationalist foreign policy to flourish changed in his second 
term. Jokowi is attempting to find an opportune time to “trigger alignments” through his 
GMA doctrine.  
In the meantime, however, domestic politics do not allow Jokowi to have more 
liberty in foreign policymaking. But Jokowi has to remain in the game and will therefore 
need to implement a foreign policy that best fits the situation. Similar to Putnam’s 
description of a player in the two-level game, Jokowi will seek to “satisfy domestic 
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pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.”113   The 
remaining sections of this chapter will describe the pressures three domestic factors, 
namely the state of Indonesia’s economy, public opinion of the president, and strength of 
the president’s political coalition, exerted during the respective presidencies and how 
changes in these domestic factors influenced their foreign policy approaches.      
B. SBY’S PRESIDENCY: INDONESIA’S GOLDEN DECADE? 
When Professor Klaus Schwab, founder and chairman of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) presented SBY with the “Global Statesman Award” in the Philippines in 
May 2014, he described the period of SBY’s presidency as Indonesia’s “Golden 
Years.”114 Indonesia’s past decade under SBY has indeed seen a period of high economic 
growth. Indonesians rewarded SBY’s leadership by returning him as president for a 
second term with a landslide victory in 2009. Popular support of SBY peaked when he 
was running as a candidate in the 2009 Indonesian presidential elections and went into 
decline halfway through his second term until he left office in 2014.           
1. State of Economy  
When SBY was sworn into office on 20 October 2004, the Indonesian economy 
was starting to show signs of recovery from the devastation of the 1997–98 Asian 
Financial Crisis but had not shaken off its reputation “as an economic and political 
‘basket case.’”115 Indonesia’s economy, in comparison with the immediate aftermath of 
the AFC, experienced a period of sustained economic growth during SBY’s presidency 
and it was especially apparent as he started his second term as president.  
The economy had contracted by 13.1 percent in 1998 but was able to rebound to 5 
percent growth by 2004. During SBY’s first term as president, Indonesia’s foreign direct 
investments were low due to widespread perceptions of internal instability. Indonesia’s 
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average foreign direct investment (FDI) growth as a percentage of GDP in the period 
between the AFC and SBY’s presidency was -1.1 percent.116 As SBY entered his second 
term, the economy had fully recovered and Indonesia had paid off its IMF debt. Indonesia 
was gaining a reputation of an emerging economic powerhouse in the region, if not the 
world. Recognition of Indonesia’s economic potential was cemented in 2008 when the 
country was inaugurated into the G20 major economies. 
The growth rate for Indonesia’s FDI was increased during his second term. FDI 
increased from an average of 1.5 percent during his first term and steadied at 2.4 percent 
average during his second. During SBY’s decade-long presidency, Indonesia’s GDP 
growth peaked at 6.3 percent in 2007. In fact, SBY pointed out in a newspaper interview 
that “Indonesia’s economic growth averaged 5.9 percent from 2009 to 2013, much higher 
than the US, Europe, Japan, or other regional peers.”117 
Based on GDP and FDI growth rates, the SBY administration improved 
Indonesia’s economy. Compared to its collapse during the AFC, the Indonesian economy 
did not suffer from a precipitous drop during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–
08. Indonesia’s GDP growth rates declined from 6 percent in 2008 to 4.6 percent in 2009 
and rebounded rapidly to reach a pre-crisis growth level of 6.2 percent in 2010. Instead of 
widespread turmoil that characterized the country during the AFC, Indonesia was praised 
for showing resilience during the GFC.118  
  By 2012, on the back of declining commodity prices, Indonesia’s GDP growth 
rate started to decline and dropped to 5 percent in 2014. By most measures, 5 percent 
GDP growth was laudable especially when global commodity prices were declining. A 
greater concern that threatened SBY’s legacy of economic stability, however, was the 
problem of inequality. Generally, declining poverty rates and income inequality indicated 
that the economic growth had been inclusive and the country as a whole had benefited 
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from its economic endeavors. In SBY’s first term, Indonesia’s poverty rates reduced from 
16.7 percent to 14.2 percent.119  In his campaign for re-election in 2009, SBY promised 
to reduce poverty rates to below 10 percent within five years.120 Although Indonesia’s 
poverty rates were reduced by 2.9 percent to 11.3 percent in 2014, the spotlight was 
focused on SBY’s failure to deliver on his promise.121  
The World Bank published a critical report on Indonesia’s problem of inequality 
in October 2014. The reported stated that despite halving its poverty rates from 24 
percent to 12 percent between 1999 and 2012, Indonesia’s Gini coefficient had risen from 
0.32 to 0.41 in the same period.122 Between 1996 and 2005, the Gini coefficient inched 
up from 0.31 to 0.34. But between 2008 and 2012, the Gini coefficient shot up from 0.34 
to 0.41 and showed that the widening of income gap had accelerated during SBY’s 
presidency.  
In sum, SBY’s presidency saw a period of GDP growth and economic stability for 
Indonesia. Judging by the economy’s ability to weather the GFC, SBY’s economic policy 
had been effective in bringing sustained growth during his tenure. But as the end of his 
second term neared, the structural weaknesses in Indonesia’s economy were exposed. A 
global downturn in commodities trade showed that Indonesian economy was heavily 
reliant on commodities trade and vulnerable to the sector’s price changes. In addition, 
Indonesia’s economic growth was not equally shared among Indonesian; Indonesia’s 
income distribution worsened and the drop in poverty rates failed to impress the 
Indonesians.  
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2. Public Opinion 
The number of opinion polls on political matters has increased in the post-
reformasi period and has become a vital political indicator that politicians ignore at their 
own peril. Opinion polls have caused a number of effects that are novel in Indonesian 
politics.123 One of the effects is that political actors and institutions are more attuned to 
the demands of the voters and have to make decisions that the electorate finds acceptable. 
Unlike the era of authoritarian rule, Mietzner observes that contemporary Indonesian 
politicians must take voters’ preferences into consideration, which is consistent with the 
analysis of the two-level game.124 Politicians who do not provide adequate and timely 
responses to the electorate demands have borne the consequences by failing to stay in 
public office.125  
As a democratically elected president, SBY was not immune to political trends in 
Indonesia and, according to Edward Aspinall, was “notoriously sensitive to public 
opinion.”126 SBY’s consideration of public opinion reflected the way he viewed his role 
as the leader of a democracy and his realistic assessment that the president’s legitimacy 
was dependent on the electorate. SBY’s attention to the vagaries of Indonesian public 
opinion paid off in the months leading up to the presidential elections in July 2009. 
Although SBY’s proposal to cut fuel prices earlier in the year drew protests from other 
presidential candidates, the Gallup Poll of Indonesia showed that 92 percent of 
Indonesians approved of SBY’s performance between April and May 2009, just in time 
for elections.127 Opinion polls proved to be an accurate assessment of SBY’s popularity 
because he won more than 60 percent of the votes in the first round of voting and 
returned as Indonesia’s president without the need for a run-off vote.        
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There were several factors that helped SBY maintain relatively high levels of 
approval ratings throughout much of his presidency. For example, SBY’s management of 
the 2004 tsunami crisis in Aceh and the subsequent peaceful resolution of the region’s 
separatist conflict had impressed Indonesians.128 SBY’s commendable performance as 
leader of a country in crisis was all the more impressive given that the natural disaster 
had struck in the early part of his presidency. The approval ratings for SBY appear to 
correlate directly with Indonesia’s economic performance. Indonesia’s post-AFC 
economic recovery and news of the country paying off its IMF debt in 2006 boosted the 
president’s approval ratings. According to LSI’s polls, SBY’s approval ratings rose from 
67 percent in December 2006 to peak at 85 percent in July 2009.129  
During SBY’s second term, his approval ratings steadily declined from its peak to 
70 percent in January 2010 and to 63 percent in December 2010. Tracking the opinion 
polls conducted by the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI-C), public opinion of SBY 
continued to grow negative and his approval ratings fell below 50 percent in June 2011 to 
47.2 percent and bottomed out at 30 percent in May 2013.130 Besides economic causal 
factors, the public’s increasing awareness of pervasive corruption that continued to 
plague Indonesian politics also kept SBY’s approval ratings low.131 A series of high 
profile cases cast doubts on the government’s ability to eradicate corruption and the 
president’s integrity.132 For the rest of his presidency, SBY was unable to recover from 
the decline and led to widespread dissatisfaction with the president’s indecisiveness in the 
handling of national problems. 
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Despite the decline in his second term, SBY’s “approval ratings … would have 
been the envy of most democratically elected leaders.”133 Taken together, public opinion 
of SBY throughout his presidency was generally positive. SBY had proven his leadership 
and won the support of Indonesians. This support translated into an impressive first round 
victory at the 2009 presidential elections where SBY fended off challenges from two 
other presidential candidates. 
3. Strength of the President’s Political Coalition  
Winning an Indonesian presidential election by a large margin is certainly the 
result of strong support from the electorate but that does not necessarily equate to having 
a strong political mandate. The political disconnect between the Indonesian polity and its 
people is caused by the victorious presidential candidate forming a broad political 
coalition in order to achieve a majority in parliament. In the context of Indonesian 
politics, Aspinall, Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa argue that coalitions constitute political 
parties that seek alliance in order to gain access to a share of state power for private 
gains, “rather than to identify opportunities to steer policy.”134 There are few, if at all, 
shared political philosophical similarities within the coalition. The transactional rather 
than ideational nature of coalition forming has become a feature of Indonesian politics.  
During his first term, SBY formed a cabinet that consisted of politicians from 
seven parties and held 73 percent of the DPR. After his re-election, SBY formed his 
cabinet with politicians from a reduced six-party coalition but retained a high 75 percent 
majority of the seats in the DPR.135 Theoretically, forming a majority coalition should 
ease the process of policymaking because bills motioned in parliament are more likely to 
be passed. In practice, because of problems such as conflicts of interest and misaligned 
policy directions, SBY often had to play the role of the “moderating president.”136 
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Instead of making hard political decisions and assuming responsibility for them, SBY’s 
approach was to delay, and even to avoid, controversial decisions. Such an approach, 
when used indiscriminately and repeatedly, diluted SBY’s leadership and caused critics 
to view him as an indecisive leader. 
As the political moderator of his coalition, SBY sought consensus among the 
members but will avoid issues that have intractable differences between parties or 
individuals in the coalition. SBY’s propensity to avoid confrontation and preference for 
stability led him to focus on resolving problems that are less controversial. Problems that 
the Indonesian president is required to tackle, however, are usually complex and 
contentious problems. The domestic issue of fuel subsidies illustrated SBY’s 
indecisiveness. Despite knowing that fuel subsidies were taking up more than a fifth of 
the country’s budget and should be reduced to fund urgent infrastructure investments, 
SBY was unable to decisively increase subsidized fuel prices. He has repeatedly backed 
down after proposing to increase subsidized fuel prices and opposition to proposed fuel 
subsidies cut come from both the public and within the coalition.137  
SBY saw the need to form a broad political coalition as a necessity of Indonesian 
politics and took a utilitarian view on his role as a president. He acknowledged that a 
broad coalition can provide him with the political support to facilitate policymaking and 
remain in power but the different political parties that comprise the coalition can also 
bring incompatible political stances that divide the polity. As president and leader of the 
coalition, SBY assessed that he should “moderate these divisions by mediating between 
the conflicting forces and interests to which they gave rise” and thereby reduced himself 
to function as “a moderator rather than a decision-maker.”138 
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C. JOKOWI’S RISE: INHERITING ASIA’S NEXT POWERHOUSE? 
Jokowi’s rise in Indonesian politics has been meteoric. Less than a decade after 
starting in his political career as mayor of Surakarta (Solo), Jokowi was nominated as a 
presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential elections. As mayor of Surakarta between 
2005 and 2012 and governor of Jakarta between 2012 and 2014, Jokowi was known for 
his hands-on approach, emphasis on transparency, and penchant for reforms. Leading up 
to his victory in the presidential elections, Jokowi had gained a reputation of being 
reform-minded and effective as a public administrator. Jokowi developed his popular 
hands-on approach in which he conducts unannounced visits (blusukan) to poor areas 
under his administration to understand the challenges faced by the poor. During the 
presidential elections, he started out as a strong favorite but rapidly lost ground to 
Prabowo who ran a more polished campaign that sought to undermine the prevailing 
democratic regime and focused on economic nationalism. In the end, Jokowi was able to 
maintain the lead and won the elections by highlighting the importance of good 
governance and accountability. 
1.  State of Economy  
In many ways, there is much to celebrate about the Indonesian economy Jokowi 
inherited from SBY in 2014. Indonesia’s economic performance under SBY had several 
notable positive points. Except for the one year immediately following the GFC, 
Indonesia’s GDP grew by at least 5 percent every year. Poverty rates did not fall below 
SBY’s target of 8 to 10 percent but have seen a modest 5.4 percent decline from 16.7 
percent to 11.3 percent. Unemployment has seen some improvement with rates dropping 
from 9.9 percent to 5.9 percent. Alongside Mexico, Nigeria, and Turkey, Indonesia is part 
of the MINT countries. Similar to the term BRIC, which is formed by Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China, MINT represents a new bloc of countries identified to possess the 
economic potential to take-off in the coming years ahead. Plaudits have poured in with 
some claiming Indonesia to be Asia’s next China.139 While Indonesia’s macroeconomic 
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indicators appear healthy, the economy has structural problems that Jokowi’s 
administration will have to resolve.     
SBY’s exit from office in October 2014 coincided with Indonesia showing signs 
of a weakening economy. Indonesia’s capital market, as with many other developing 
economies, is vulnerable to capital outflows in response to news of the United States 
Federal Reserve announcing the impending end of quantitative easing. The value of the 
Indonesian rupiah dropped below Rp 15,000 against the dollar, which represents rates 
that were last seen during the AFC.140 With the global outlook on economic growth 
softening and China’s economy slowing down, decreasing demand for commodities have 
sent prices tumbling and economies that are reliant on commodities trade, such as 
Indonesia and Australia, have suffered.141 Falling commodity prices have put pressures 
on Indonesia’s economy and exposed the country’s economic vulnerability in that it is 
heavily dependent on the performance of the commodity sector. 
Sustained improvements in Indonesia macroeconomic indicators such as GDP 
growth rates, poverty rates, and unemployment rates belie the structural problems that 
exist in the Indonesian economy. Economic data and accolades, Mietzner says, “may 
have lulled the Indonesian Government and public in the wrong belief that the country’s 
economic development is inevitable and thus does not require the sort of major 
infrastructure effort other nations have undertaken.”142 Comparing the investments on 
infrastructure in Indonesia, China, and India, Mietzner observes that the 3.9 percent of its 
GDP Indonesia spent on infrastructure in 2009 was much lesser, much less than the 10.4 
percent and 7.5 percent China and India respectively spent on infrastructure in the same 
year.143 Indonesia’s expenditure on infrastructure was certainly lagging. In May 2011, 
SBY announced the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s 
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Economic Development (MP3EI), which included plans for $468.5 billion worth of 
investments, including in infrastructure projects, to be made over the next 14 years.144 
Although Indonesia’s economy seems poised for growth in the short run, the assessment 
is that the country’s infrastructure is in urgent need of investment.   
Jokowi did not waste time addressing the economy’s needs. Besides targeting to 
increase infrastructure spending, his economic policy had a strong focus on improving 
the quality of the Indonesian workforce. To that end, the government launched the 
Productive Family welfare program, which comprises the Prosperous Family Card 
(KKS), the Indonesia Health Card (KIS), and the Indonesia Smart Card (KIP) in 
November 2014.145 Collectively, the program aims to improve accessibility to education 
and health services by providing free health insurance to impoverished Indonesia’s and 
reducing the cost of education. In order to fund his welfare program, Jokowi announced 
that fuel subsidies will be cut and in doing so, he has also unlocked 15 percent of the 
state’s budget that will be diverted into Indonesia’s infrastructure investment plans.146  
Unlike fuel subsidy cuts in the past, Indonesians did not carry out street protests. 
This positive development was fortuitously helped by falling global oil prices. Instead of 
the expected Rp 3,000 increase per liter, when fuel subsidies were actually cut, fuel 
prices dropped from the subsidized price of Rp 8,500 per liter in December 2014 to Rp 
7,600 per liter in January 2015. Nevertheless, Jokowi initiated cash transfer programs to 
help needy Indonesians facing financial problems caused by the removal of fuel 
subsidies.  
Believing the more he delayed cutting fuel subsidies, the greater his political risk, 
Jokowi acted immediately and delivered a strong signal to the investors that Indonesia’s 
new administration is embarking on pro-market reforms. In February 2015, following the 
removal of fuel subsidies, Jokowi was reported to have told his diplomatic corps to step 
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up efforts to promote economic diplomacy and “to turn [Indonesia’s] negative trade 
balance into a surplus one.”147 In his speech at the World Economic Forum meeting in 
April 2015, Jokowi marketed Indonesia’s economic potential to his audience, encouraged 
investors to invest in Indonesia, and candidly welcomed investors to call him if they face 
any problem.148  
By getting the controversial fuel subsidies out of the way early in his presidency, 
Jokowi has shown political savviness and, more importantly, firmness to a country that 
has grown weary of the previous administration’s useless vacillation. Jokowi’s socio-
economic policy is likely to improve productivity levels of Indonesian workers. 
Similarly, investments in infrastructure will expand Indonesia’s capacity and 
connectivity. These efforts augur well for Indonesia’s economic performance but results 
will not be immediately observable.  
2. Public Opinion 
As a political outsider who has ascended the highest public office in Indonesia, 
Jokowi values the popular support he receives and knows the importance of public 
opinion in Indonesian politics. However, unlike his predecessor’s obsession with public 
opinion, Jokowi seems less enamored with the need to maintain high approval ratings. 
Instead of moderating the peace by dithering on decisions, Jokowi appears to be more 
interested in winning support through action rather than inaction. Jokowi decided to cut 
fuel subsidies, for example, knowing it will be an unpopular move, but he did so 
believing it was a decision that will benefit Indonesians. Undeniably, cutting fuel 
subsidies to spend on infrastructure can also signal to foreign investors that Indonesia 
under Jokowi is serious about economic reforms.   
Judging from Jokowi’s decision to sink foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing 
and execute convicted foreign drug smugglers, one could argue that he is applying to his 
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foreign policy the same principle of benefitting Indonesians. Although Jokowi’s 
nationalist foreign policy can appear to other countries as aggressive and confrontational, 
majority of Indonesians support Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy and tough stance on 
illegal drug use. If, as some have suggested, one of Jokowi’s reasons for enacting 
aggressive policies on foreigners was to stoke nationalist sentiments and boost his 
domestic popularity, there is no evidence that Jokowi succeeded.149 
According to an opinion poll conducted by Indo Barometer, a Jakarta-based 
survey agency, more than 84 percent of respondents supported Jokowi’s decision to 
execute the convicts on death row.150 Based on the poll results, many Indonesians view 
drug use as a threat to society and death sentences will deter drug-related offenses. In a 
survey conducted by the Social and Political Study Center (Puspol) Indonesia, 756 
respondents in three cities, including Jakarta, were asked questions on the performance of 
Jokowi’s administration in six areas. On Jokowi’s maritime policy, 74.07 percent of 
respondents supported the policy to sink foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing in the 
country’s territorial waters.151 Yet the same survey also recorded 74.60 percent of 
respondents being dissatisfied with Jokowi’s first three months as president.152  In other 
words, Indonesians supported Jokowi’s foreign policy decisions but there was no 
corresponding rise in his approval ratings.  
Based on polls conducted by the LSI-C, approval ratings for Jokowi was highest 
in August 2014 at 71.73 percent, immediately after winning the elections.153 Ratings 
plummeted in November 2014 to 44.94 percent and dropped further in January 2015 to 
                                                 
149 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia Sinks 34 Foreign Ships in War on Illegal Fishing,” The 
Diplomat, August 19, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/indonesia-sinks-34-foreign-vessels-in-its-war-
on-illegal-fishing/.  
150 Rachman, “Death Penalty Stance,” Wall Street Journal (blog). 
151 Hans Nicholas Jong, “People Starting to Lose Faith in Jokowi, Says Survey,” Jakarta Post, 
January 22, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/22/people-starting-lose-faith-jokowi-says-
survey.html.  
152 Jong, “Lose Faith,” Jakarta Post. 
153 “Jokowi’s Approval Rating Below 50 Percent,” Jakarta Post, January 30, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/30/jokowi-s-approval-rating-below-50-percent.html.  
 46 
42.29 percent, after Jokowi announced and commenced his “sink the vessels” policy..154 
Similarly, there is insufficient evidence from opinion polls to conclude that the execution 
of foreign drug smugglers in April 2015 improved Jokowi’s approval ratings. Survey 
institution Indo Barometer polled Jokowi’s approval ratings in March 2015, before the 
execution took place, as 57.5 percent, which was higher than the 41.7 percent recorded in 
a June 2015 poll conducted by another survey consultancy, Saiful Mujani Research and 
Consulting (SMRC).155 If Indonesians are indeed supporting Jokowi’s foreign policy, the 
support is not translated into approval ratings, or at least the support is not enough to 
reverse the decline in Jokowi’s approval ratings.  
Although Jokowi’s nationalist foreign policy did not produce a boost to his 
domestic popularity, it does not mean that was not the intention. However, there are other 
more compelling reasons for Jokowi to adopt an assertive foreign policy on illegal fishing 
and foreign drug smugglers. There is the issue of safeguarding Indonesia’s sovereignty, 
which is also the foremost priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sovereignty takes 
on different dimensions here because it refers simultaneously to Indonesia’s right to 
claim its territorial waters, safeguard the natural resources contained therein, and exercise 
its laws. For example, on the execution of convicted drug smugglers, Jokowi asked for 
mutual respect on the sovereignty of law between countries.156 In addition to sovereignty 
issues, Jokowi’s decisions are aligned to his pro-people policy. The “sink the vessels” 
policy protects Indonesians’ fishing rights and the tough stance on illegal drug use 
protects Indonesians from the dangers of drugs.       
Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi reflects both the people’s will and the 
president’s beliefs. Under Jokowi, public opinion continues to matter in foreign 
policymaking in democratic Indonesia. But unlike SBY who avoid making hard decisions 
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and appear indecisive, Jokowi is willing to weigh the cost of political risks and take a 
hard stance on matters that will benefit Indonesian, even if they are unpopular. From 
cutting fuel subsidies to sinking errant foreign vessels, Jokowi applies the principle of 
balancing cost and benefit to his decisions and is less averse to risky choices thus far in 
his presidency.  
There is, however, a price for Jokowi’s risk-balancing approach to foreign 
policymaking. The price has been the public’s confidence in his ability to fulfill his 
promises. According to SMRC’s polls, the percentage of Indonesians who are confident 
of Jokowi honoring his promises have plunged from 74.5 percent in October 2014 to 54.9 
percent in July 2015.157 But Jokowi can take consolation in that the figure has clawed up 
by just over 7 percent to 62 percent in October 2015.158 Despite a general decline in his 
approval ratings, polls show that among possible contenders, including Prabowo, Jokowi 
remains as Indonesians’ most popular choice of president. 
3. Strength of the President’s Political Coalition  
As the first president to enter office controlling a minority parliament, Jokowi’s 
political coalition was weaker than the one SBY formed as president. Weak political 
support in parliament poses a challenge in policymaking for any president in a democracy 
and for Jokowi there was no exception. On his inauguration, Jokowi’s 
Awesome Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat or KIH), led by the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) formed 37 percent of the parliament. Rival 
coalition, the Red and White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih or KMP), led by Prabowo’s 
Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party dominated the DPR with a 63 percent 
majority. A divided parliament meant that Jokowi was more likely to face challenges 
when seeking policy approval.  
The expectation in Indonesian politics was that political parties will offer their 
political support and form coalition in exchange for a share of political power such as a 
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cabinet appointment or other public office. This form of political cartel discourages 
parties to compete and provide credible opposition. Instead, Indonesia’s political cartels 
form to consolidate power among oligarchic elite that undermines democratic ideology 
and state authority. Inside the coalition, prominent oligarchs, defined by Aspinall “as a 
dominant class arising from an informal fusion of state and economic power,” are 
nominated by their respective parties for office and exploit state resources for private 
gains.159 
In the face of such overwhelming political opposition, Jokowi was adamant on his 
commitment to separate political support from political office. Even as he reached out for 
support from his political rivals, he insisted that “there will be no transactions.”160 In 
other words, Jokowi will not trade a cabinet position in exchange for political support. As 
a result, political parties in the opposition coalition chose to remain and Jokowi’s became 
the first Indonesian president with a minority parliament. Jokowi’s biggest political 
challenge, however, comes from his own coalition. For example, Jokowi’s nomination of 
Budi Gunawan in January 2015 as police chief was particularly damaging to his personal 
image of being transparent. Budi, who is a close associate of former president and 
chairperson of the PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was subsequently charged by the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK) for 
suspected corruption but Jokowi did not immediately withdraw the nomination. It was 
only after much public dissatisfaction that Jokowi retracted Budi’s nomination and 
replaced him with Badrodin Haiti. In a series of twists, Budi was eventually appointed 
deputy police chief in April 2015 following an internal police process. 
This episode was widely regarded as an example of Jokowi’s inability to manage 
intra-coalition pressures, especially those from Megawati. Nominating Budi, who had 
been under investigation since 2010, compromised Jokowi’s political integrity. Yet, this 
episode also show the power and influence of the oligarchic system that operates within 
Indonesian politics and the challenges a reform-minded president such as Jokowi face. 
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The strength of Jokowi’s political coalition is, therefore, not only represented by the 
number of seats his coalition has in parliament. For someone who belongs outside of the 
oligarchic elite, the strength of Jokowi’s political coalition is also a measure of his ability 
to manage those who seek to undermine the state’s power and authority from within the 
political system. 
D. A TIME FOR FRIENDS AND A TIME FOR ENEMIES 
SBY had presided over a period of political and economic stability in Indonesia. 
Resource-rich Indonesia was enjoying economic growth because of the commodities 
sector boom led by China’s economy. As Indonesia’s economy grew, complacency sets 
in and SBY did not want to upset the oligarchs in control of Indonesia’s natural 
resources, therefore a golden opportunity for the country to develop alternative engines of 
growth was missed. Although income distribution strongly favored the oligarchs, many 
Indonesians benefited from the growth and rose out of poverty. Despite growing concerns 
over the Indonesian economy’s structural weakness due to underinvested infrastructure 
and lack of industrial reforms, strong economic growth contributed to a positive public 
opinion of SBY. As the country began to turn around after a period of turmoil caused by 
regime change and financial crisis, glowing accolades showered upon Indonesia inflated 
Indonesians’ confidence. The growing sense of self-confidence, coupled with 
Indonesians feeling more hopeful and optimistic about their future led to higher approval 
ratings for SBY. The president’s political coalition was numerically strong and the 
opposition provided little impact. SBY was keeping the coalition together by allowing 
oligarchs to operate and by managing conflict among different political factions.161  
Indonesia’s domestic conditions between the start of his first term and midway 
through his second enabled SBY to pursue a foreign policy that focused on 
multilateralism and economic cooperation. Such an approach was also aligned to SBY’s 
nature to avoid conflict. As domestic politics and economy stabilized, SBY saw an 
opportunity to grow soft power. He did so by tapping into Indonesia’s image of “a 
country where democracy, Islam, and modernity go hand-in-hand,” pursuing an 
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internationalist foreign policy that promoted democratic and human rights issues.162 
During this period, SBY was able to “trigger realignments” across the two-level game 
and rebuild Indonesia’s reputation. Under SBY, the image of Indonesia as a model of 
success in political and economic development came to dominate global perceptions. 
This reversal in Indonesia’s image was certainly a remarkable recovery but without 
sustained efforts to institutionalize reforms in Indonesia’s politics and economy, the 
country was unable to adapt to changes in the global economy.163 The initial responses 
by SBY’s administration to counter the effects of a declining commodities market were 
mainly to enact “nationalist and protectionist policies” but they were insufficient to 
resolve the structural problems.164 By the 2014 presidential elections, populist measures 
to address the ills of Indonesian economy sprung forth and nationalist sentiments grew 
among Indonesians.165  
Rising to power from humble beginnings and bearing no connections to the 
oligarchic elites that looted Indonesia of its riches, Jokowi’s election win held promise of 
much needed reforms that would renew the hopes of Indonesians. Trumpeting his vision 
of transforming Indonesia into a global maritime power through his GMA doctrine, 
Jokowi invoked a resurgence of nationalism that had undergirded Indonesia’s aspirations 
to be a global leader. Reality, however, prevented him from embarking on the 
transformative journey he envisaged. Facing a structurally weak economy, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, underfunded military, and powerful Indonesian oligarchs, 
reform-minded Jokowi realized quickly that these problems require careful political 
maneuvering and long-term planning. In order for Indonesia to have a chance of 
becoming a global maritime power, Jokowi will need to create the capacity for change in 
Indonesia while biding for an opportune time to push through reforms.  
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In the meantime, the president has to pick issues that provide the best leverage in 
terms of maximizing nationalist sentiments while containing the harmful effects of frayed 
bilateral ties. An example is Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy. Thus, far, Jokowi’s 
administration has been careful to emphasize that Indonesia has the sovereign right to 
protect its natural resources from foreign exploitation. It has been repeatedly stressed that 
the policy is lawful and other countries should respect Indonesia’s sovereignty and its 
implementation of domestic laws.166 Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy ticks a lot of 
boxes: it is aligned to aspects in the GMA doctrine that seeks to safeguard Indonesia’s 
maritime resources for economic gains; it protects Indonesian fishermen livelihood; and 
it highlights the potential of Indonesia’s maritime and fishery industry. For good 
measure, the dramatic destruction of the seized vessels enjoys widespread coverage on 
media. Admitting that exploding seized vessels was mostly for the spectacle in an 
interview, the KKP detonated 41 foreign vessels, including the first Chinese vessel, on 
National Awakening Day in May 2015 and 34 foreign vessels on Independence Day in 
August 2015.167 
Jokowi continues to lead the country and endeavors to retain his seat at the two-
level game. Global demand for commodities remains weak and the lackluster economic 
outlook looks set to continue in the foreseeable future. Indonesia’s economy is likely to 
continue growing at about 5 percent but Jokowi’s economic plan has to consider 
government intervention to bring about poverty alleviation and equitable income 
distribution. His approval ratings continue to decline and political support from his 
coalition remains low. Some of his early political decisions, such as cutting of fuel 
subsidies, choice for police chief and cabinet positions, have damaged his credibility.168 
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Jokowi has to continue to strike delicate balance in politics by reciprocating support with 
some form of incentives and avoid succumbing to cartelization or oligarchic pressure. 
Domestic and international conditions dictate that Jokowi is more likely to gain public 
and political support by advancing a nationalist foreign policy. However, while he adopts 
a more aggressive and confrontational stance on foreign policy issues, Jokowi has to be 
mindful not to jeopardize diplomatic ties.  
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III. “SINK THE VESSELS” POLICY: JOKOWI’S FOREIGN 
POLICY ADVENTURISM 
This chapter is a case study of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy and tracks the 
evolution of Indonesia’s approach to its illegal fishing problem. The chapter starts with 
an overview before showing how Indonesia’s current nationalist approach to its illegal 
fishing problem has concurrently produced results in some aspects and exposed its 
limitations in others. For example, the government’s efforts have led to more foreign 
vessels being seized for illegal fishing, which is a positive development for the fishing 
industry, but the push to enforce Indonesia’s fishery laws have also exposed the country’s 
limited resources for fishery monitoring and policy incoherence across the various 
government agencies. Even as Jokowi wants to continue to sink the foreign fishing 
vessels, the problem of illegal fishing is too massive and complex for Indonesia to handle 
unilaterally. This puts both Jokowi’s efforts to reform Indonesia’s economy and his 
approval ratings at risk. In the near-term, Indonesia’s economy will not be able to meet 
the demand for resources required to eradicate illegal fishing and develop its fishing 
industry. Going forward, the immensity and intricacies of Indonesia’s illegal fishing 
problem will prove to be an overmatch for Jokowi’s unilateral solution. The next section 
describes how Indonesia intends to widen its unilateral approach by incorporating 
cooperative solutions in order to overcome its resource constraints in eradicating illegal 
fishing. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the different approaches adopted by 
the two presidents and an explanation of Indonesia’s “sink the vessels” policy and the 
eradication of illegal fishing as a linchpin of Indonesia developmental goals and a 
showcase for Jokowi’s administration to exhibit its technocratic competence.   
A. WAGING A WAR ON ILLEGAL FISHING 
In November 2014, President Jokowi “declared war” on illegal fishing activities 
in Indonesian waters.169 Expressing grave concern over the extent and range of problems 
that illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing was causing Indonesia, Jokowi 
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concluded that errant vessels, including foreign ones, must be seized and destroyed in 
accordance with Indonesia’s law.170 According to a 2012 Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) report on Indonesia’s fishery and aquaculture 
profile, 54 percent of an Indonesian’s animal protein intake comes from fishery 
production and fish represents the cheapest source of animal protein for majority of the 
population.171  The fishing industry is also a key source of employment for Indonesians, 
especially the low-wage earners in the coastal regions and outlying islands. Fishing 
provides livelihood for 6.4 million Indonesians and constitutes 3 percent of Indonesia’s 
GDP.172 Jokowi’s concerns are warranted because a threat to fishery production has a big 
impact on Indonesia’s food and economic security. 
The first tranche of vessels impounded for illegal fishing were destroyed in early 
December 2014 amidst much media publicity. Since then, a series of public sinking of 
foreign vessels has taken place as part of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy.173 While 
Jokowi’s administration has offered numerous reasons for enacting such a drastic 
measure on illegal fishing vessels, an underlying message that was consistently 
emphasized was Indonesia’s sovereign right to enforce its laws. During the past year of 
the “sink the vessels” policy, the scope of the illegal fishing problem in Indonesian 
waters has focused on the domestic aspects such as the impact on the economy and 
preserving the livelihood of local fishermen. However, judging by Indonesia’s recent 
articulation of the illegal fishing “as a form of transnational organized crime,” there 
appear to be efforts to draw in regional implications of illicit fishery activities, giving 
hints of possible adjustments to the heretofore unilateral approach that has prevailed 
under Jokowi.174 Incorporating a multilateral approach to the illegal fishing problem can 
resolve some of the challenges imposed by the lack of resources. As yet, without 
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evidence of tangible actions taken to swing towards a cooperative solution to eradicate 
illegal fishing, it remains to be seen if Indonesia will indeed change tack. In the 
meantime, Indonesia is continuing its “sink the vessels” policy against illegal fishing. 
B. SCOPE OF THE ILLEGAL FISHING PROBLEM 
The effects of illegal fishing are multifarious and recent investigations by the 
KKP show that the enormity of the problem is matched by its pervasiveness. As a result, 
Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem carries more than just economic costs; overfishing by 
poachers also threatens the sustainability of fishery resources and livelihood of small-
scale fishermen. The adverse effects of illegal fishing are sufficient for the FAO to 
recognize it as “a major problem” in Indonesia.175  
Certainly, the problem is not new and the fishery laws that Indonesia is enforcing 
now were ratified before Jokowi’s presidency. Notwithstanding, Indonesia has never 
been as aggressive in enforcing its laws on illegal fishing and the sinking of foreign 
vessels has never involved as much theatrics. For most of Jokowi’s presidency, Indonesia 
has looked upon illegal fishing as a domestic problem that can be solved unilaterally. 
Jokowi’s unilateral approach puts diplomatic ties at risk by pursuing a unilateral 
approach. While the “sink the vessels” policy has undoubtedly created awareness of the 
problem but it has also exposed Indonesia’s resource limitations to completely eradicate 
the problem.    
1. Too Many Vessels, Too Few Resources  
Illegal fishing operations conducted by foreign vessels take place daily among 
thousands of fishing boats in Indonesia’s expansive waters. Some of the foreign fishing 
vessels have legitimate rights to fish in Indonesian waters while others do not. With 
Indonesia’s existing fisheries monitoring system, it is difficult to differentiate between 
licensed and unlicensed foreign fishing vessels with certainty. One of the earliest steps 
the KKP took to eradicate illegal fishing was to impose a moratorium on issuing of 
foreign fishing permits in order to work on new regulations and review the existing 
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fishing permits. Under Marine and Fisheries Minister Regulation 56/2014, effective from 
November 3, 2014, Indonesia has stopped granting and renewing of fishing permits.176 
Instead of the original planned six months of moratorium, the KKP extended the ban by 
another six months in order to complete an audit of the fishing permits.177 In all, the 
ministry took 11 months to audit a total of 1,132 fishing permits for large-sized foreign 
vessels and discovered that every audited vessel had violated some form of Indonesian 
fishing laws and regulations.178 The findings from the audit resulted in the ministry 
invalidating 291 foreign fishing permits and meting out disciplinary actions, such as 
suspension and issuance of warnings, to 156 permit holders. The problem’s prevalence 
lends credence to estimates by Indonesian authorities who claim more than 5,400 fishing 
vessels are operating illegally in Indonesian waters.179   
The monitoring of illegal fishing activity poses an overwhelming challenge to 
Indonesian authorities. The sheer vastness of Indonesian waters and the innumerable 
vessels fishing at any one time test Indonesia’s ability to monitor illegal fishing activities 
and enforce the law. For instance, then Rear Admiral Widodo, commander of the 
Indonesian navy’s Western Fleet Command pledged support to Jokowi but anguished 
over the lack of resources.180 Widodo, who has been promoted to Vice Admiral and is 
currently the Deputy Chief of Navy, said that the naval ships were straining to meet all of 
its requirements because just over a quarter of the navy’s fuel requirements in 2014 were 
met.181  
Indonesia’s inability to comprehensively monitor illegal fishing activities and 
enforce its fishery laws exposes the dire state of its navy and maritime security forces, 
including the newly established Maritime Security Board (BAKAMLA). Based on 
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available indicators such as GDP growth rates and economic trends over the next few 
years, Indonesia will continue to face a shortage of resources to conduct patrols and law 
enforcement. During his presidential campaign, Jokowi had promised to increase the 
defense budget allocation to 1.5 percent of GDP.182 The caveat to his promise, however, 
was that Indonesia’s economy must grow at least 7 percent.183 With the economy 
projected to grow 5.3 percent in 2015 and growth in 2016 and beyond marked by 
cautious optimism, Indonesia’s defense budget looks set to remain tight for the next few 
years.184 In fact, Indonesia’s 2016 defense budget of Rp 99.5 trillion is less than the Rp 
102.3 trillion received by the military in 2015.185 So long as Indonesia’s military and 
maritime security forces remain underfunded and ill-equipped, the country’s ability to 
maintain comprehensive awareness of its fishery zones and conduct law enforcement in 
its waters will continue to struggle.    
2. Between Legal Sovereignty and Diplomatic Sensitivities 
According to Article 69, Paragraph 4 of Law No. 45/2009 on Fisheries, 
Indonesian authorities are “entitled to take special actions in the form of burning and/or 
sinking a fishing ship flying a foreign flag based on sufficient initial proof.”186 It is 
stipulated that Indonesian authorities functioning to control and enforce law in 
Indonesia’s fishery management zone, consisting of Indonesia’s internal waters, 
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), are entitled to destroy foreign fishing 
                                                 
182 Sita W. Dewi, “Jokowi Promises to Triple Defense, Security Budget,” Jakarta Post, June 3, 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/03/jokowi-promises-triple-defense-security-budget.html. 
183 Dewi, “Jokowi Promises,” Jakarta Post. 
184 “RI Growth Projection 5.3% for 2016,” Jakarta Post, September 22, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/22/ri-growth-projection-53-2016.html and “2016 to Remain 
Sluggish for RI Economy: Bahana,” Jakarta Post, October 17, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/17/2016-remain-sluggish-ri-economy-bahana.html.  
185 Lili Sunardi, “Kementerian PU Dapat Anggaran Terbanyak Dari APBN 2016,” Finansial, 
November 2, 2015, http://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20151102/10/488148/kementerian-pu-dapat-anggaran-
terbanyak-dari-apbn-2016 and Nani Afrida, “House Questions Defense Budget Cut,” Jakarta Post, 
September 8, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/08/house-questions-defense-budget-
cut.html. 
186 “Amendment to Law No. 31 Year 2004 Concerning Fishery,” FAO, accessed October 16, 2015, 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins97600.pdf.  
 58 
vessels. Therefore, the actions taken by Indonesian authorities in blowing up or sinking 
foreign fishing vessels are in accordance with Indonesian domestic law.  
Indonesia’s policy of sinking foreign vessels is not new; Indonesian authorities 
were permitted to destroy foreign illegal fishing vessels since 2009 but Indonesia’s 
enforcement of its fishery laws has intensified under Jokowi. According to Asep 
Burhanudin, the director general of marine resources supervision from Indonesia’s 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries Ministry, Indonesian authorities sank 33 of 38 foreign 
vessels caught illegally fishing in Indonesian territorial waters between 2007 and 
2012.187 Illegal fishing boats from Vietnam accounted for 32 of the 33 boats that were 
sunk during that period. By contrast, Susi Pudjiastuti, in her first year as Minister for 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries, has sanctioned the destruction of 106 foreign boats that 
were fishing illegally in Indonesian waters.188 Based on ministerial data reported in the 
Jakarta Post, the nationalities of the illegal fishing boats that were wrecked under Susi’s 
leadership were more varied, with boats coming from the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and China.189  
Brushing aside concerns over the harm caused by Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” 
policy on diplomatic ties, Asep maintains that the “the important thing” is that 
Indonesia’s marine resources are protected.190 Indeed, several high level Indonesian 
public officials, including ministers, have stated that Jokowi’s harsh measure will achieve 
the intended effect of eradicating illegal fishing without compromising diplomatic 
relations. Susi seems convinced that she has “established persuasive coordination” with 
ambassadors of Australia, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, 
regarding Indonesia’s position on illegal fishing.191 According to Susi, regional countries 
understand that illegal fishing to Indonesia means more than “stealing fish but also 
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sovereignty as well as environmental sustainability.”192 The minister has pitched the 
“sink the vessels” policy to the other countries as judicial punishment for stealing from 
Indonesia.193 Susi believes that other countries will see Indonesia’s actions simply as law 
enforcement and not confrontational.194 Foreign Minister Retno, and then Coordinating 
Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Minister, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno also made similar 
statements in concert that downplayed the diplomatic blowback and emphasized on the 
policy’s legality.195 
Implausible as it may seem, Jokowi’s administration expects countries whose 
nationals have had their fishing vessels dramatically and publicly detonated in a foreign 
country to acquiesce in Indonesia’s antagonistic foreign policy. Occasionally, the sinking 
of foreign fishing vessels was deliberately conducted to stoke nationalism among 
Indonesians. In particular, two widely-publicized large-scale “sink the vessels” events 
were held on dates that had nationalistic significance. One was on Indonesia’s National 
Awakening Day in May 2015 in which the first Chinese fishing vessel was among 41 
foreign vessels sunk. Another 34 foreign vessels were sunk on Indonesia’s Independence 
Day in August 2015.  
Both of these mass public sinking drew responses from China and Vietnam. 
Amidst requests for Indonesia to clarify on its policy and to constructively seek 
cooperation in the fishery sector, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson also 
highlighted that “China expresses strong concern” about the sinking of a Chinese fishing 
boat.196 In similar vein, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesperson said that Vietnam was 
“seriously concerned” about the sinking of Vietnamese fishing boats that were captured 
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for fishing illegally in Indonesian waters and had send a diplomatic note asking Indonesia 
to treat the retained Vietnamese fishermen humanely.197   
A strongly worded editorial in the Bangkok Post tersely further exposes 
Indonesia’s unrealistic expectations.198 The editorial, published in January 2015, accuses 
Indonesia of exaggerating its monetary loss and slights Indonesia’s ability to enforce laws 
within its boundaries. Describing the sinking of foreign vessels as “aggressively 
destructive,” “undiplomatic,” and “unfriendly,” the editorial recommends Indonesia to 
stop the sinking or risk retaliatory actions by its ASEAN partners and neighbors.199 
Despite Indonesia’s insistence that it is merely enforcing its laws, the reactions from 
other countries clearly show that acrimony has been built up between Indonesia and some 
of the countries affected by the “sink the vessels” policy. But as the rest of this chapter 
will show, when the scope of the illegal fishing problem in Indonesia expands to include 
transnational issues of human rights abuse, regional countries will have to relook at their 
responses to Indonesia’s anti-illegal fishing campaign.    
3. The Case of MV Hai Fa: Exposing Indonesia’s Policy Incoherence 
Indonesia’s handling of MV Hai Fa, a Panama-flagged Chinese fishing vessel 
that was detained and fined Rp 200 million for its illegal fishing activities in Indonesian 
waters, has exposed the country’s lack of policy coherence on illegal fishing. Normally 
applied to national development agendas, the concept of policy coherence is defined as 
“the systematic application of mutually reinforcing policies and integration of 
development concerns across government departments to achieve development goals 
along with national policy objectives.”200 Policy coherence is about different national 
agencies working in concert to generate “synergies and complementarities” and actively 
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seeking to fill policy gaps so as “to meet common and shared objectives.”201 Therefore, 
policy coherence requires all relevant agencies to align their individual policies and 
commit to a single cause. But the various Indonesian public institutions involved in the 
MV Hai Fa case appear to display nonaligned behavior.   
The KKP, with help from the Indonesia navy, seized MV Hai Fa for illegal 
fishing activities on December 27, 2014.202 The fishing vessel was found with 900 tons 
of ocean catch, including 66 tons of hammerhead sharks and oceanic whitetip sharks that 
belong to Indonesia’s list of prohibited catch.203 According to the KKP, the value of the 
catch found in MV Hai Fa was estimated at Rp 70 billion. Much to the disappointment of 
Susi, the Ambon Fisheries Court fined the vessel’s captain a mere Rp 200 million, which 
amounted to a slap on the wrist.204 Essentially, the court fined the captain of the vessel 
but did not press criminal charges.205 In defense of the Ambon Fisheries court, the 
Attorney General Office (AGO) said that prosecutors had brought all substantiated 
charges on the vessel.206 However, in an embarrassing blunder, the vessel managed to 
sneak pass local port authorities and fishery monitoring agencies and exit Indonesia’s 
porous maritime borders undetected and without the necessary documents.207  
The disappointing outcome of the MV Hai Fa court proceedings and Susi’s 
awkward admission of security slipups drew questions from different actors. There were 
doubts that the various national agencies under Jokowi’s administration shared the same 
level of commitment to eliminate illegal fishing. Speaking on behalf of the People’s 
Coalition for Fisheries Justice Indonesia (KIARA), a non-governmental organization that 
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looks after the Indonesian small-scale fishermen, Abdul Hakim, KIARA’s secretary-
general accused the AGO of failing to support Indonesia’s drive to eradicate illegal 
fishing.208 Hakim lamented that the AGO, in approving the request from the Maluku 
Prosecutor’s Office to fine the captain of MV Hai Fa, has missed out on several other 
charges that carry heavier sentences including larger fines and jail terms. To support his 
accusation, Hakim provided a list of laws that MV Hai Fa could have broken but were 
not considered by the AGO. Ultimately, both Hakim and Susi agreed that the paltry fine 
was unable to deter other fishing vessels from operating illegally in Indonesian waters.209  
Undaunted by the court’s feeble decision, Susi pressed investigators from her 
ministry to uncover more incriminating evidence against MV Hai Fa.210 Susi filed for 
appeal because she wanted to bring more charges against the fishing vessel and prevent 
setting a low benchmark in the courts for high profile cases of illegal fishing.211 The 
protracted case had the owner of MV Hai Fa threatening to sue Susi for defamation and 
filing a report with the Indonesian police, only to be rejected by the Indonesian police for 
lacking legal basis.212 Besides the MV Hai Fa, Susi was similarly disappointed by the 
verdict on five other Chinese fishing vessels that were charged with illegal fishing and 
wanted the prosecutors to file appeals on the cases.213 Susi had also directed her anger 
towards the Indonesian navy for not acting quickly enough to capture vessels suspected 
of illegal fishing.214 The accusatory tone extended to the Jakarta Post reporting that the 
navy’s failure to meet its intended target of catching 22 Chinese vessels, including the 
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MV Hai Fa, had “raised questions about the navy’s commitment to safeguarding the 
country’s territory.”215  
These series of incidents indicate that the fishery laws have expanded and 
strengthened but Indonesia’s judiciary remains impotent. It appears that not all of the 
public agencies were as enthusiastic and driven regarding Indonesia’s campaign against 
illegal fishing. A similar point is made by Aria Bima, member of PDI-P, who said that 
Jokowi “had made a good start, but with minimal results as a result of a lack of 
ministerial cooperation.”216 Bima’s observations and the obstacles faced by Susi’s KKP 
show that policy coherence within the government is necessary to achieve the intended 
outcomes.  
4. The Hidden Cost of Illegal Fishing 
Among the different costs associated with illegal fishing, monetary cost and 
environmental cost are most commonly cited. Monetary cost refers to the value of fishery 
products that foreign fishermen take out from Indonesian waters and represents a loss in 
revenue to Indonesian economy. Environmental cost usually refers to the problem of 
overfishing, which is when the amount of catch exceeds the maximum sustainable yield 
and the fish stock starts depleting. It could also mean the damage done to the marine 
environment because of fishermen employing harmful fishing methods that upset the 
delicate natural balance of the ocean. The balance could be disrupted by the use of trawl 
nets because trawling leads to overfishing, indiscriminate fishing, and coral reef 
destruction. 
The monetary cost of Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem is significant. 
Indonesian officials claim that 30 percent of global losses from illegal fishing occur in 
Indonesia.217 The monetary loss from illegal fishing costs the Indonesian economy an 
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estimated Rp 300 trillion annually.218 The lost revenue is transferred out of the 
Indonesian economy and into the private coffers of companies operating the fleets of 
illegal fishing vessels. 
Despite the monetary loss incurred, the fishing industry makes significant 
contributions to Indonesia’s GDP. As it stands, the fishing industry constitutes 21 percent 
of Indonesia’s agricultural sector and 3 percent of its GDP.219 The fishing industry’s 
yearly growth rates published in the 2014 KKP annual report show that it consistently 
exceeds Indonesia’s GDP growth rate and is the best performer in the entire agricultural 
sector consisting of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries production.220 According to a 
business appraisal of Indonesia’s maritime and fisheries sectors published in the Jakarta 
Post in August 2015, the fishing industry’s sterling performance is likely to continue.221 
In order to harness the economic potential of Indonesia’s maritime and fisheries sectors, 
the Indonesian government must succeed in curbing illegal fishing. 
More than just a loss of revenue, large scale illegal fishing also hides a host of 
other problems that negatively impact Indonesia economically, socially, and 
environmentally. An example of a hidden cost of illegal fishing is the smuggling of 
Indonesia’s subsidized fuel: foreign fishing vessels operating in Indonesian waters 
replenish their fuels stores at sea by buying subsidized fuel that has been smuggled out of 
Indonesia. In an interview with the Jakarta Post, Susi bemoaned the irony that foreign 
fishing vessels engaged in illegal fishing activities in Indonesian waters are using fuel 
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subsidized by the Indonesian government while some Indonesian fishermen are deprived 
of subsidized fuel for their legal fishing activities.222   
Another hidden cost of illegal fishing is the worsening of economic conditions of 
small-scale Indonesian fishermen. According to Anambas Islands Deputy Regent, Abdul 
Haris, foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing drive out local fishermen.223 Haris notes 
that Indonesian fishermen with their small fishing boats are unable to compete with 
foreign fishermen. Unlike foreign fishing vessels that operate commercial fishing 
equipment, local fishermen usually conduct small-scale fishing by using traditional 
fishing methods. Haris claims that in areas where fish are plentiful, foreign fishermen 
drive local fishermen out by deliberately colliding with the small boats.224 As a result of 
foreign illegal fishing, many Indonesian fishermen, who are already impoverished, are 
prevented from eking out their livelihood in small-scale fishing. Without effective 
incentives or punitive measures to ensure the sustainability of Indonesia’s marine 
ecosystem, foreign fishermen often fish using destructive methods, such as trawling, and 
leave behind a marine ecosystem that is permanently destroyed. From the description of 
the unfair competition posed by foreign illegal fishermen to local fishermen, the social 
and environmental dimensions of the problem of illegal fishing in Indonesia become 
apparent. 
C. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE ILLEGAL FISHING PROBLEM 
There are indications that Indonesia has begun expanding the scope of the illegal 
fishing problem a year into Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy. Instead of restricting the 
illegal fishing problem to a domestic issue that Indonesia has to face alone, the scope of 
the problem is being expanded to define illegal fishing as an international problem that 
demands multilateral cooperative actions. According to Mas Achmad Santosa, the head 
of the KKP’s illegal fishing prevention task force, expanding the scope of the illegal 
fishing problem is part of the ministry’s “post-moratorium national plan of action 
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(NPOA).”225 Even as Jokowi’s administration continue to build on the narrative of 
Indonesia as a victim of illegal foreign exploitation, the narrative has taken a new 
trajectory to describe illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime and a vehicle for 
other syndicated illicit activities. As discussed in the preceding section, the eradication of 
Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem and enforcement of its fishery laws entail a big 
demand for resources. The Indonesian navy has already cited the lack of fuel budget as a 
limiting factor in its ability to support the country’s eradication efforts. Budgetary 
resources are limited and will continue to be limited. This is because of competing 
demands from Indonesia’s plan to develop its infrastructure and the newly implemented 
social welfare programs. Poor economic growth rates worsen the situation because the 
government’s budgets in the coming years are unlikely to increase. The NPOA should not 
be viewed as Indonesia shifting away from its existing unilateral approach; rather, 
Indonesia’s approach has been widened to incorporate multilateral solutions to overcome 
the country’s resource challenge. 
1. Post-Moratorium National Plan of Action 
The KKP’s NPOA encompasses several different components that are related to 
illegal fishing. As reported in the Jakarta Post, the NPOA “will focus on policies 
promoting sovereignty, sustainability and prosperity, as well as optimizing the ability to 
detect, respond and punish perpetrators of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing.”226 For example, the linking of Indonesia’s aggressive “sink the vessels” policy 
to wider issues of good governance and investor confidence in Indonesia by Susi can be 
interpreted as part of the NPOA.227 Specifically, the Indonesian government has been 
calling for illegal fishing to be approached as a transnational organized crime that acts as 
cover for a slew of other illicit activities.228 These illicit activities include human 
smuggling, slavery, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of endangered species. Along 
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with the expansion of illegal fishing’s scope of problem is the renewed focus to seek 
cooperative solutions at the ASEAN level.229 Pursuing cooperative solutions does not 
preclude the continuation of Indonesia’s unilateral “sink the vessels” policy. In fact, 
following the announcement of the NPOA in early October 2015, Minister Susi was 
reported in late October 2015 to have reiterated her ministry’s efforts to eradicate illegal 
fishing and that the sinking of illegal fishing boats was proof of the government’s 
commitment to finding a solution.230 In the same report, the KKP’s director general said 
that the ministry has plans to sink more boats. The Indonesian navy also announced its 
plans to sink more vessels after the NPOA was revealed.231        
In a keynote speech made at the Second International Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement Conference in November, Susi has called on the regional and 
international community to recognize illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime 
and to come together to work on finding a solution.232 Susi’s description of Indonesia’s 
illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime echoes the sentiments made by 
Indonesia’s police chief, Badrodin Haiti, during the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in September 2015. Badrodin reported that the 
transnational nature of illegal fishing poses a challenge to law enforcement because 
beyond Indonesia’s sovereign boundaries, enforcement protocols on illegal fishing 
between different countries are absent.233 
2. Not Just About Stealing Fish 
The sinking of foreign fishing vessels represents a drastic measure adopted by 
Jokowi’s administration to eradicate illegal fishing. But in Susi’s opinion, it is a necessity 
because she thinks that the unbridled illegal fishing in Indonesian waters “distorts good 
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governance and jeopardizes economic growth.”234 The strident nature of Jokowi’s “sink 
the vessels” policy symbolizes the will of the Indonesian government in resolving a 
longstanding problem that has beleaguered Indonesia.235 Susi believes that the 
Indonesian government has to take strong actions to eradicate illegal fishing and enforce 
law and order within its waters in order to boost investor confidence.236 With greater 
confidence in Indonesia’s commitment to the rule of law, investors are more likely to 
invest in Indonesia and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry. The funds can then be 
channeled to build new fishery ports, upgrade the existing port infrastructure, and 
improve Indonesia’s overall maritime connectivity. At the national level, the 
development of Indonesia’s fishing industry and upgrading of the country’s infrastructure 
are aligned with Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and will contribute towards transforming 
Indonesia into a maritime power.  
Indonesia’s realization of the extent of human rights abuse in the fishing industry 
has provided the government with additional motivation to eradicate illegal fishing. 
Human rights abuses in the form of enslavement and torture of foreign fishermen are not 
isolated cases and Susi says that it is “embarrassing for Indonesia” to be at the 
international forefront of human rights abuse in fishing industry.237 Susi’s remarks were 
made in reference to the prominent slavery case in the remote Indonesian island of 
Benjina, near Maluku. Investigations into the irregularities of Thai and Indonesian fishing 
industries by the Associated Press in March 2015 discovered that men from all over the 
Southeast Asia, majority of who were Burmese, were stranded on Benjina in what 
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appeared to be an organized form of modern slavery.238  The situation was sufficiently 
dire for Jokowi to quickly establish a special task force to rescue the fishermen.239  
In the initial wave of rescue, more than 320 foreign fishermen were evacuated 
from Benjina.240 Many of those who remained on the island chose to do so because they 
harbored beliefs that they will be paid their withheld wages.241 Up to 550 foreign 
fishermen were eventually released from working under inhumane conditions.242 Based 
on estimates by the International Organization for Migration, there may be up to 4,000 
foreign fishermen who are stranded in the group of islands surrounding Benjina, many of 
whom are victims of human trafficking.243 Indonesian fishermen working overseas are 
just as affected by the human rights abuse in the fishing industry. According to Susi, up 
to 61,000 Indonesian fishermen working on foreign fishing boats operating in New 
Zealand are treated as slaves and subjected to torture.244 In line with Jokowi’s pro-people 
diplomacy, the government will need to address the maltreatment of Indonesian 
fishermen working overseas and the KKP has sought help from the New Zealand 
ambassador to address the issue.245 
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Unraveling the many layers of interrelated transnational crimes associated with 
illegal fishing and exposing the hidden costs of Indonesia’s hijacked fishing industry 
have provided Indonesian authorities with the opportunity to press for cooperation with 
countries while maintaining its unilateral approach in eradicating illegal fishing. The 
initiative to have illegal fishing listed as a transnational organized crime has gained 
support from Ono Surono, a member of the House of Representatives’ Commission IV 
overseeing agriculture and fisheries and the environment.246 Ono thinks that collective 
action by members of ASEAN and regional countries will enable individual countries to 
overcome their challenges in enforcing anti-illegal fishing laws and has called for the 
establishment of a regional illegal fishing institution to provide oversight.247  
Adding the dimension of human rights abuse in the fishing industry seems to have 
acted as a catalyst in speeding up discussions between countries to cooperate on anti-
illegal fishing solutions. Several countries that share maritime borders with Indonesia 
have agreed to a work together on eradicating illegal fishing. In the aftermath of the 
Benjina case, Indonesia and Thailand agreed in April 2015 to set up a joint taskforce on 
illegal fishing and disrupt the syndicates that conduct illicit activities in the fishing 
industry. In May 2015, the Philippines and Indonesia agreed to tackle the illegal fishing 
problem together, kindling hopes of reviving bilateral fishing agreement discussions that 
have stalled since 2006.248 In similar fashion, Indonesia has established new levels of 
agreement with Australia “to strengthen its cooperation with Indonesia on combating 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices, and to engage at the 
operational level and promote sustainable fisheries governance.”249  The most recent 
participant is Papua New Guinea and the two countries have signed a Joint Communique 
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to combat IUU fishing in their waters.250 At the signing, Susi reiterated that besides “loss 
of revenue, illegal fishing opens doors to other crimes and human rights violations,” and 
repeated the call for “illegal fishing to be classed as a transnational crime.”251  
D. TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
In her first annual press statement as minister for foreign affairs, Retno lamented 
that illegal fishing has been occurring unchecked in Indonesian waters “for far too long” 
and said the government “is determined and committed” to eliminate illegal fishing.252 
Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem started before Jokowi’s presidency and attracted 
varying levels of attention from past presidents. Evidence from the post-reformasi era 
indicates that efforts to resolve the problem of illegal fishing were intermittent and plans 
to develop Indonesia’s fishing industry were neglected. Following reformasi, the most 
significant change related to Indonesia’s fishing industry was former President 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s decision to establish the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
in 2000.253 In October 2006, repeated statements by the KKP on the issue of illegal 
fishing and public calls for the government to “save the country’s fishing industry from 
poachers” were not heeded.254 Then, the KKP had estimated that foreign fishing vessels 
were causing the Indonesian economy to lose Rp 20 trillion annually. In March 2008, an 
article assessing Indonesia’s approach to eradicate illegal fishing contended that regional 
and bilateral agreements “have not shown any significant results” and “illegal fishing 
continues to be a problem in Indonesia.”255 The ineffectiveness of diplomatic solutions 
prompted SBY to amend Law No. 31/2004 on Fisheries to the present Law No. 45/2009 
in October 2009. Although Indonesian authorities were accorded more punitive power, 
                                                 
250 “PNG and Indonesia Sign Communique to Combat Illegal Fishing,” PNG Mirror, December 1, 
2015, http://www.pngmirror.com/png-and-indonesia-sign-communique-to-combat-illegal-fishing/. 
251 “Sign Communique,” PNG Mirror. 
252 Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement.” 
253 “New Fisheries Ministry Urged for New Cabinet,” Jakarta Post, August 15, 2000, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2000/08/15/new-fisheries-ministry-urged-new-cabinet.html. 
254 “Fishermen Need More Than Gesture,” Jakarta Post, October 22, 2006, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/10/22/fishermen-need-more-gesture.html. 
255 Edi Suharto, “ASEAN 2009: Time to Deal with Illegal Fishing,” Jakarta Post, March 23, 2008, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/03/23/asean-2009-time-deal-with-illegal-fishing.html. 
 72 
fishery laws were poorly enforced – only 38 foreign vessels were caught for illegal 
fishing between 2007 and 2012.  
The prolonged neglect of Indonesia’s fishing industry and the passivity in 
resolving the problem of illegal fishing indicate that they were not priorities of the SBY 
government. SBY’s internationalist approach to foreign policy extended to the measures 
he took to resolve the problem of illegal fishing. The Indonesian government under SBY 
did not enforce fishery laws and passively relied on regional and bilateral agreements to 
curb illegal fishing. The reasons for not enforcing fishery laws or taking a tougher stance 
on illegal fishing are related to the characteristics of SBY’s presidency. Indonesia lacked 
maritime assets to safeguard its fishing industry and did not wish to blow up foreign 
fishing vessels and risk entering into conflict with other countries. What is clear is that 
the SBY did little to resolve Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem during his decade-long 
presidency. Between 2006 and 2014, there was a 15-fold increase in the KKP’s estimates 
for loss revenue from illegal fishing with the latest estimates at Rp 300 trillion. Now, 
illegal fishing in Indonesia is being described as a problem that is entrenched within a 
network of transnational organized crime. It is also clear that SBY handed over to Jokowi 
a problem that has grown bigger and more complex. 
Jokowi takes a different approach to resolve Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem. 
The eradication of illegal fishing is featured in one of five pillars of Jokowi’s GMA 
doctrine and is listed as one of Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities. Indonesia’s fishery 
resources, just like its energy and mineral resources, are seen to be exploited by 
foreigners and join the list of natural resources that need to be protected to benefit 
Indonesians. Jokowi has promised “to make a commitment to using the sea to help 
improve the welfare of the Indonesian people and a strong commitment to enforce 
[Indonesia’s] sovereignty in [its] waters.”256 The Indonesian fishing industry is a vital 
component of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and has the potential to develop into a key engine 
of growth for the economy. In order for the fishing industry to make sustainable 
contributions to the economy, the Indonesian government will need to ensure that its 
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maritime resources are protected and fish stocks are not depleted through illegal fishing. 
The successful eradication of rampant illegal fishing in Indonesian waters will provide a 
crucial boost to Jokowi’s vision of transforming Indonesia into a maritime power. After 
taking office, Jokowi has unsurprisingly paid close attention to Indonesia’s illegal fishing 
problem but has unexpectedly opted to take an aggressive approach to eradicate illegal 
fishing.  
Domestically, the effects and cost of illegal fishing straddles the political, 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental realms. Regionally, with the KKP’s NPOA, 
illegal fishing is couched as a transnational organized crime that masks a slew of other 
illicit activities including human trafficking and slavery. Finding a solution for illegal 
fishing by foreign fishing vessels will invariably involve diplomatic actions by Indonesia. 
Consequently, Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy draws elements from many government 
ministries and agencies, such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, KKP, 
and BAKAMLA. The “sink the vessels” policy therefore becomes a representation of his 
administration’s ability to deliver on promises. If rampant illegal fishing, especially by 
foreign fishing vessels, were to continue, Jokowi’s credibility as Indonesia’s president 
would be undermined. In addition, his GMA doctrine and vision for Indonesia to 
transform into a global maritime power will be in jeopardy. 
Suffice it to say, Indonesia’s decision to put focus on the problem of illegal 
fishing is not all that surprising. Illegal fishing has ramifications on several domestic 
issues and is featured as an area of priority for Jokowi’s administration. However, it is 
Jokowi’s unilateralist approach and the lack of disdain for confrontation that have caused 
consternation among scholars and analysts. Indonesia’s decision to resolve its problem of 
illegal fishing through the aggressive enforcement of the “sink the vessels” policy 
deviates from the modalities of conflict avoidance and multilateralism preferred by SBY. 
For these reasons, the epitome of Indonesia’s nationalist turn in foreign policy under 
Jokowi is exemplified by the “sink the vessels” policy.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. THE BURDEN OF DOMESTIC EXPECTATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
ON FOREIGN POLICY  
Indonesians voted Jokowi into office with hopes that he would bring much needed 
political and economic reforms to the country. The optimism harbored by Indonesians 
was not unwarranted; they had pinned their hopes on a president who, as mayor of 
Surakarta, was awarded second runner-up of the 2012 World Mayor Prize.257 According 
to reports, Jokowi was praised for turning the “crime-ridden city into a regional center of 
arts and culture” and his anti-corruption campaign. As a reform-oriented politician, 
becoming Jakarta’s governor in September 2012 accorded Jokowi a bigger platform to 
showcase his technocratic credentials. Jokowi’s successes in Jakarta further cemented his 
credentials as a leader who could deliver effective governance and propelled him quickly 
up the political ladder. By October 2014, Jokowi was presented with Indonesia’s highest 
office to drive reforms that will bring the country to its rightful place in the global arena.    
As a non-elite, political outsider with no military links, Jokowi was “ushered in 
on a wave of hope” by the Indonesian electorate.258 Foreign media coverage of Jokowi’s 
election win reflected the exuberance felt throughout Indonesia.259 Interestingly, four 
months before the election results were announced, Sukma made the observation that 
should Jokowi win the election, “domestically, there would be the difficult challenge of 
managing the high expectations.”260 Based on the evidence provided in Chapter II, after 
becoming president, the trends in Jokowi’s approval ratings suggest that public 
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expectations were not met but the public opinion polls indicate that majority of 
Indonesians remain hopeful of the president delivering on his promises.261   
The existence of cartelization among Indonesian political parties and a powerful 
oligarchy in Indonesia has ensured that political and economic reforms will be rigorously 
scrutinized by the political and business elites  – not for their effectiveness but the impact 
to the elites’ accessibility to power and profit. The lack of political reforms during SBY’s 
presidency has allowed inter-party collusion in Indonesian politics to dull the competition 
for credible alternative policies from the opposition and constructive feedback in 
parliament. Power-sharing politicians who are more interested in strengthening their 
bargaining position within Indonesia’s oligarchy than pushing through economic reforms 
that can benefit the Indonesian economy form oversized coalitions in parliament. Worse, 
these elites block reforms that are disadvantageous to them at the expense of the state. 
Indonesia’s oligarchic system has locked the country into a pattern of yawning income 
gap between the elites and ordinary Indonesians. Without much needed economic 
reforms and investments in infrastructure development, the Indonesian economy finds 
itself unable to diversify its exports away from natural resources. 
In analyzing the domestic factors that shape Indonesia’s foreign policy, the thesis 
found that both SBY and Jokowi face the same challenge of running an economy, 
responding to the vagaries of public opinion, and managing their political coalition. Yet, 
SBY has chosen to keep a short-term view on the economy instead of making painful and 
unpopular, but necessary decisions to generate economic vitality and build resilience. 
While SBY sought international recognition and public adulation through conflict 
avoidance, Jokowi carefully allow public opinion to shape his policy choices without the 
need “to abandon [his] responsibility for independent leadership” and sacrifice sensible 
governance.262 SBY considered the need to form broad political coalitions an 
inconvenient necessity despite knowing the propensity for corruption in the system. By 
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contrast, Jokowi understands the expediency of political horse trading but refuse to 
capitulate in the face of seemingly insurmountable political pressure.  
Context matters in evaluating why the two Indonesian presidents have taken 
different approaches to the same problem. This thesis has focused on the domestic 
factors; therefore, the concluding chapter will explain the key points of Jokowi’s “sink 
the vessels” policy and his approach to Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem mentioned in 
Chapter III to the three domestic factors discussed in Chapter II. Finally, the thesis argues 
that Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to the changes in the characteristics of the 
three domestic factors, vis-à-vis Putnam’s two-level game theory, caused the nationalist 
turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.             
B. EXPLAINING JOKOWI’S “SINK THE VESSELS” POLICY 
1. The Multiplier Effects of Indonesia’s Fishing Industry  
Although Indonesia’s fishing industry is not a panacea for all of the country’s 
economic problems, it certainly is a key component of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine. Despite 
SBY’s promises of economic reforms and infrastructure spending, Jokowi inherited an 
Indonesian economy that is overly dependent on the commodities sector and has poorly 
developed infrastructure. Jokowi’s efforts to develop Indonesia’s overlooked and 
neglected fishing industry have the potential to uplift Indonesia’s economy, ignite 
alternative engines of growth, and improve port infrastructure in one fell swoop. 
Therefore, Jokowi’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing and develop Indonesia’s fishing 
industry have effects that will be multiplied across adjacent industrial sectors. Enhancing 
maritime connectivity among the Indonesian islands will also be a boon to the logistics 
sector and unleash economic potential of less connected coastal settlements in the 
expansive archipelago.   
Indonesian authorities have firmly asserted that the sinking of foreign fishing 
vessels was in accordance with Indonesian fishery laws. That assertion, however, cannot 
explain Indonesia’s decision to make a spectacle out of the sinking. Jokowi could have 
destroyed the boats without the fanfare. The connection made by Susi between sending a 
strong signal to show the government’s commitment to law enforcement and attracting 
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investors is relevant here.263 It is too early to measure the success of Jokowi’s “sink the 
vessels” policy and it remains to be seen if investors will be convinced by Indonesia’s 
efforts to improve the governance of its fishing industry.  
In the meantime, the government has also taken steps to ensure Indonesia’s 
marine fisheries resources are protected from foreign exploitation. The KKP has issued 
Ministerial Regulation No. 56/2014 to ban the transshipment of ocean catch at sea.264 
The principle of banning transshipment at sea is similar to Law No. 4/2009 on Mineral 
and Coal Mining, which bans the export of unprocessed minerals. Both laws are designed 
to ensure that the high value processing phases of the supply chain remain in Indonesia 
and motivate investors to establish more processing facilities. Efforts to retain high value-
add production processes in Indonesia reinforce Jokowi’s intent to develop the fishing 
industry.       
2. Indonesia’s Sophisticated Electorate 
On the influence of public opinion on Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy, the 
research found evidence showing that part of the reason for Jokowi to publicly sink ships 
was to boost popularity. The aggressive policy was popular with Indonesians but did not 
translate to higher popularity for Jokowi. If Jokowi had intended to use the dramatic 
public sinking of foreign ships to bolster his approval ratings, the policy did not produce 
the necessary effect of reversing his declining popularity. The evidence discussed in 
Chapter II clearly showed that Jokowi’s approval ratings continue to fall even as more 
boats were detonated. It would be presumptuous to conclude that Jokowi’s policy helped 
to reduce the rate of decline in public opinion of his presidency.  
The impact of “sink the vessels” policy on approval ratings for Susi, the KKP’s 
minister and lead in Indonesia’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing, however, can be 
evaluated with more conviction. Susi was the outright winner in popularity polls 
conducted on Jokowi’s cabinet. Results from a public opinion poll conducted by LSI in 
                                                 
263 Amindoni, Sinks 106,” Jakarta Post. 




January 2015 show approval ratings for Susi at 61 percent.265 In the runner-up positions 
were taken by the religious affairs minister at 48.4 percent and social affairs minister at 
48.3 percent.266 Susi’s popularity was not short-lived. Her ministry was placed at the top 
with a 25.2 percent approval rating by SMRC’s poll conducted in July 2015. The 
approval rating for the fisheries ministry was more than three times higher than the 
runner-up – religious affairs ministry – with 8 percent.267         
The Indonesian electorate is increasingly sophisticated and it is simplistic to think 
that Susi’s popularity was founded upon nationalist Indonesians enjoying the spectacle of 
seeing foreign ships getting blown up. At this juncture, it is useful to review Mietzner’s 
findings on the Indonesian electorate in his study of the growing number of opinion polls 
in Indonesia and its impact on Indonesian politics. Mietzner’s analysis suggests that 
contrary to conventional wisdom, Indonesian voters were not easily hectored by 
authorities or swayed by gifts; the electorate was “much more sophisticated (and 
diversified)” than what they are given credit for.268 “Most voters,” as Mietzner observes, 
“have very concrete wishes when it comes to the profile of their ideal candidate for 
public office and the policies he or she should pursue,” and appraisals are primarily based 
on performance.269  
Going back to Susi’s popularity, it shows that voters are indeed discerning and 
have specific expectations of politicians. On the country’s efforts to eradicate illegal 
fishing and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry, Indonesians have attributed credit to 
Susi but not Jokowi. The Indonesian electorate has shown that it does not measure the 
performances of cabinet ministers and the president with the same yardstick. Susi’s high 
approval ratings do not mean that Jokowi was ineffective. Instead, Jokowi can claim that 
his cabinet, which he dubbed as the “Working Cabinet” (Kabinet Kerja), was indeed 
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working.270 Susi’s high approval ratings and the popularity of the government’s efforts to 
eradicate illegal fishing and develop the fishing industry help to shore up overall approval 
ratings for the Jokowi’s administration. The success of the “sink the vessels” policy 
contributed to maintaining the 62 percent of Indonesians who continue to believe that 
Jokowi can deliver on his promise.271  
3. First, Reform the Economy 
Generally, Jokowi did not face resistance in parliament on his “sink the vessels” 
policy. Similarly, there is no direct opposition to his plan to develop Indonesia’s fishing 
industry. Despite holding a minority parliament, Jokowi was given free rein to execute 
his anti-illegal fishing policy. The state of Indonesian politics is consistent with the 
political nature of cartel parties. However, it cannot be taken for granted that the lack of 
contestation in parliament over Jokowi’s drive to eradicate illegal fishing indicates that 
the oligarchs are equally acquiescent. As Jokowi pushes for more economic reforms in 
sectors outside of the fishing industry and open the Indonesian economy to global 
markets and competition, the political elites, finding their positions of strength 
compromised, may stop being cooperative in the political sphere.  
Two recent developments in Indonesia augur well for the future of Indonesian 
politics and Jokowi’s political coalition. Without trading for favors, Jokowi’s coalition 
has expanded with the National Mandate Party (PAN) joining the KIH in September 
2015.272 Altruistically, Zulkifli Hasan said that the decision to switch out of KMP and 
into KIH was “for the benefit of the republic” and “not for personal, party or group 
interests.”273 With PAN defecting from the KMP, Jokowi’s KIH now holds the majority 
in parliament. Prior to PAN’s defection from the KMP, Jokowi had reshuffled his cabinet 
and introduced new ministers with substantial credentials in economics and trade. The 
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reshuffle in August 2015 was lauded by the media and analysts as a positive move 
towards reviving Indonesia’s ailing economy.274 While it has been argued that the 
Indonesian oligarchy is immovable, there appears to be opportunities for a reform-
minded president to exploit. By focusing on economic reforms first, Jokowi has exerted 
influence over the behaviors of the political elites and oligarchs.  
Going forward, Jokowi could stand to benefit from a broader coalition as he 
introduces more contentious economic reforms. Jokowi has explicitly stated that 
Indonesia has to move towards “labor-intensive investment” and reject “investment that 
depletes natural resources.”275 Externally, Jokowi will need to eradicate illegal fishing in 
Indonesian waters and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry. Internally, as Jokowi seeks 
to achieve policy coherence across the government, he will have to surmount the critical 
challenge of diffusing the oligarchic pressure against reforms in other economic sectors. 
If successful, Jokowi, whose focus on economic growth had seen him pressing for 
sensible policies and emphasizing on effective governance, may have found the winning 
move to “trigger realignments” across the two-level games.   
C. THE END OF “A THOUSAND FRIENDS, ZERO ENEMIES”? 
The thesis has shown the interplay between the state of the economy, public 
opinion, and the president’s political coalition. These three domestic factors combine 
with varying degrees of influence to shape Indonesia’s foreign policy. President SBY and 
Jokowi faced the same three domestic factors but each of the factors had undergone 
significant changes during the presidential transition.  
This thesis argues that SBY, who naturally preferred a multilateral approach, 
enjoyed a period whereby the three domestic factors were conducive for him to enact an 
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internationalist foreign policy. SBY’s foreign policy enabled the country’s image to be 
rebuilt and Indonesia to rise in global prominence. During this period, SBY did not push 
for change in Indonesia’s economic and political fundamentals, and the rise was not 
sustained. When the global commodities sector declined, Indonesia was caught without 
an effective response and the vulnerabilities of the economy were exposed. The economic 
situation caused nationalism to rise in Indonesia as the causes of domestic problems were 
externalized.      
Winning an election where nationalism was a dominant theme forced Jokowi to 
be sufficiently nationalistic in order to keep his political opponents at bay. While Jokowi 
may not have intended to adopt a nationalist foreign policy, his unwavering motivation to 
develop Indonesia’s economy has inadvertently caused him to adopt unilateral 
approaches to problems, as can be seen from his “sink the vessels” policy. Moreover, the 
nature of his GMA doctrine and “down-to-earth” diplomacy was inherently focused on 
domestic issues and could easily be perceived as nationalist. The challenge is for Jokowi 
to show that his nationalism is neither hostile nor anti-foreign. Instead, Jokowi’s 
nationalism is driven by his vision of creating an Indonesia that is economically strong, 
politically sovereign, and culturally independent – the principles of Trisakti.  
Specific to Indonesia’s “sink the vessels” policy, Jokowi sensed that Indonesians 
were tired of SBY’s indecisiveness. Jokowi wanted to take immediate actions to prove he 
was a decisive leader, unlike SBY. Moreover, his call to sink errant fishing vessels and 
develop the fishing industry fits with his GMA doctrine and pro-people policy. On the 
economic front, there was a serious concern that the Indonesian economy, besieged with 
structural problems, was likely to remain in the doldrums. The urgency to generate 
economic growth drove Jokowi to risk antagonizing neighbors in exchange for faster 
results. 
As the KKP continues to lead in the fight to eradicate Indonesia’s illegal fishing 
problem, it has to contend with the surge in demand for resources to enforce Indonesia’s 
fishery laws. Indonesia’s current languid economic performance is expected to persist in 
the near future and resources will grow scarcer. The KKP’s announcement of its post-
moratorium NPOA seems suited to address Indonesia’s resource constraints in 
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eradicating illegal fishing. Instead of a domestic issue that Indonesia must face alone, the 
KKP’s NPOA advocates pushing for illegal fishing to be recognized as a transnational 
organized crime with regional implications. Such a definition of illegal fishing will 
require a multilateral approach to resolve the problem. In the meantime, Indonesia is 
unlikely to stop the public sinking of foreign fishing vessels as both the KKP and the 
Indonesian navy have separately announced plans to sink more fishing vessels after 
reports on the post-moratorium NPOA were released. Although Indonesia has proposed a 
multilateral approach to its illegal fishing problem, it is retaining its “sink the vessels” 
policy. The change in approach can be argued from an economic perspective: Indonesia 
does not have the resources to tackle the problem on its own; a cooperative solution 
enables Indonesia to access more resources and overcome its domestic constraints. 
In conclusion, the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy can be traced to 
the changes in domestic factors. Responding to those changes and taking cognizance of 
the national objectives he had set, Jokowi’s foreign policy approach has been 
characterized by a willingness to take unilateral actions to resolve problems with little 
regard for the consequences those actions have on diplomatic ties. Jokowi’s nationalist 
approach is a pragmatic response to the global conditions and domestic constraints he 
face. As global conditions and domestic constraints are not static, Jokowi’s nationalist 
foreign policy will correspondingly change. In the analogy of the two-level game, what 
remains constant is the need for Jokowi to continuously strike a balance between 
adopting policies that domestic interest groups prefer without compromising the benefits 
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